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DUE-ON-SALE IN THE SECONDARY
MORTGAGE MARKET
Alan . Blocher*
During the seventies, the mortgage finance industry witnessed the
growth of two developments that threaten to collide during the eighties.
These developments were the maturation of the secondary market' for
conventional mortgages2 and a disparity of treatment of "due-on-sale"
clauses3 by the states. As recently as a few years ago, these subjects would
have been of interest only to real estate professionals and a handful of
legal scholars. Today, however, they have assumed greater importance be-
cause of the state of the home mortgage business. This article will discuss
both of these developments and suggest an approach to avoid the harmful
effects of the threatened collision.
I. SECONDARY MARKET DEVELOPMENT
Prior to 1970 there was an active secondary market for mortgages in-
sured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or guaranteed by the
Veterans Administration (VA). In 1970, for example, $12.6 billion in
FHA/VA loans were originated on one to four family properties, and an
amount equal to 90% of these loans were placed in the secondary market.
On the other hand, of the $23 billion in conventional mortgages that were
originated on the same type of properties, sales in the secondary market
* B.A., Brooklyn College, 1969; J.D., Catholic University of America, 1981. The au-
thor was Vice President of Mortgage Programs and Services of the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC). This paper, however, represents the personal efforts and
views of the author only and does not necessarily represent the views of FHLMC.
1. "The secondary mortgage market is the aggregate buying, selling, and trading of
existing mortgage loans and mortgage related securities." UNITED STATES LEAGUE OF SAV-
INGS ASSOCIATIONS, SAVINGS AND LOAN FACT BOOK '80, at 35 (1980).
2. 12 U.S.C. § 1451(i) (1976) defines a conventional mortgage for the purposes of the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation as "a mortgage other than a mortgage as to
which the Corporation has the benefit of any guaranty, insurance or other obligation by the
United States or a State or an agency or instrumentality of either."
3. "Due-on-sale" clauses vary in scope and language. Normally, they are provisions
within a mortgage or deed of trust (these terms are used interchangeably throughout, unless
indicated otherwise) which enable the mortgagee to accelerate the debt upon the transfer of
specified interests by the mortgagor.
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amounted to only 12% of that year's originations.4
There were three main reasons for the high degree of activity in
FHA/VA loans and the relatively low secondary market activity in con-
ventional mortgages, despite the almost two to one preponderance of con-
ventional mortgage originations. First, FHA/VA mortgages carry the
benefits of insurance or guaranty by the United States; therefore, purchas-
ers of such loans are assured of the ultimate collection of the mortgage,
regardless of what happens to the paying ability of the borrower.
Second, by requiring the use of approved document forms, the FHA and
VA imposed fungibility on the mortgages they insured or guaranteed. The
twin advantages of government guaranty and uniformity of documents
were lacking in the conventional mortgage market. An observer has noted:
[A] necessary precondition to a viable secondary market in
mortgages is the existence of a relatively fungible product. There
are probably over 2,000 mortgage deed of trust and related forms
in common use in the 55-odd jurisdictions in the United States.
An association in Florida, for example, is not very willing to
purchase a deed of trust from California if it is used to a mort-
gage, and the instrument is not guaranteed by the Federal
Government. 5
The third reason for the higher degree of activity in mortgages was the
existence of a federally-sponsored secondary market for FHA/VA mort-
gages. In 1948, the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) was
created to provide a market for FHA loans.6 In 1968, activities of FNMA
were divided between two separate structures. Support of subsidized hous-
ing programs was kept within the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment (HUD) in the Government National Mortgage Association
(GNMA).7 A new FNMA,' part governmental and part private, was es-
tablished for the nonsubsidized FHA/VA programs. In 1970, FNMA
purchased $5.1 billion of FHA/VA loans and retained a portfolio of $15.5
4. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Supply of Mortgage Credit 70-79 (May
21, 1980).
5. Bums, The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation-The First 400 Days and Be-
yond-.4 Legal View, 30 FED. B.J. 303, 306 (1971).
6. 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (1964) (amended 1968) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1716b
(1976)).
7. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716b, 1720, 1721 (1976).
8. Id § 1716b. Although FNMA is owned by private stockholders, the President of
the United States appoints 5 of its 15 directors. Id § 1723(b). The approval of the Secretary
of HUD is required for certain FNMA initiatives. See, e.g., id §§ 1717(b)(3), 1718(c),
1719(b). In addition, FNMA has a line of credit with the United States Treasury (currently
$2.25 billion) which it may call upon, although it has not done so in the past.
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billion,9 thus providing a significant outlet for sellers of government-
backed mortgages.
Recognizing the need for an organized secondary market for the more
numerous conventional mortgages, Congress enacted the Emergency
Home Finance Act of 1970.10 Title II of the Act granted FNMA the au-
thority to deal in conventional mortgages." Title III created a new entity,
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), "authorized to
purchase, and make commitments to purchase, residential
,"12mortgages ... .
Previously, although savings and loans as a group represented the larg-
est holder of mortgages, the bulk of FNMA's dealings were with mortgage
banking firms that originated FHA/VA mortgages for immediate sale to
permanent investors. 13 Because savings and loan associations were prima-
rily conventional mortgage lenders and were the largest holders of mort-
gages, the success of a secondary market for conventional mortgages
required their participation. FHLMC, therefore, was structured in a way
to promote participation by savings and loan associations. For example, its
Board of Directors includes the same three people who serve as the mem-
bers of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,' which regulates the feder-
ally-chartered savings and loan associations. Its capital stock may be
issued only to the Federal Home Loan Banks,'" which serve the savings
and loan associations in much the same way that the Federal Reserve
Banks serve the commercial banking industry. Thus, by the creation of
FHLMC and the expansion of FNMA's authority to include the purchase
of conventional mortgages, the means were provided for the development
of a government-sponsored secondary market for conventional mortgages.
The difficulties inherent in the task of developing such a market were
identified by an observer:
Unfortunately, the home mortgage market lacks several pre-
requisites of a smoothly operating market and therefore finds it
9. UNITED STATES LEAGUE OF SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS, SAVINGS AND LOAN FACT
BOOK '80, at 115 (1980).
10. Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 450 (1970) (current version at scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. (1976)).
11. 12 U.S.C. § 1717(b)(2) (1976).
12. Id § 1454(a)(1).
13. In 1970 savings and loan associations held 47% of the total holdings of mortgages on
one to four family dwellings in the United States ($310.7 billion of the total $656.6 billion).
In 1979 savings and loan associations held 54% of the total ($479.1 billion of the total $890.2
billion). 66 FED. RES. BULL. A41 (July 1980).
14. 12 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (1976).
15. Id. § 1453 (1976).
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difficult to compete with other money markets for the available
amount of savings. First, the trading units are usually too large to
attract modest investors. Secondly, the units lack homogeneity
and fungibility . . . . Thirdly, there are servicing problems to
consider. . .. Lastly, mortgages lack liquidity or marketability
and therefore, once again, are at a disadvantage when compared
to competing instruments.'6
Notwithstanding these difficulties, giant steps were made in less than ten
years following the creation of the FHLMC and the expansion of the
FNMA's authority. Perhaps the best measure of the success of FNMA and
FHLMC is the realization that, having started without any conventional
loans in the beginning of 1971, by the end of 1979 FNMA had a conven-
tional mortgage portfolio of $16.1 billion, 7 and FHLMC was supervising a
conventional portfolio of $18.2 billion.'" In addition, several large
financial institutions, such as the Bank of America and the California Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Association, had issued mortgage-backed securities
collateralized by conventional home mortgages, thereby directly accessing
capital available from investors who were not previously interested in
mortgage investments.
II. UNIFORM DOCUMENTS
The marketability of conventional mortgages depended, as mentioned
above, on the development of uniform mortgage documents. The staffs of
FNMA and FHLMC prepared notes, mortgages, and deeds of trust for
each jurisdiction. Although some tailoring was necessary to accommodate
state law, there was an attempt to make covenant clauses as uniform as
possible. The due-on-sale clause has always been one of these uniform
covenants.
In the first exposure draft of the mortgage forms, dated November 18,
1970, covenant 9, the due-on-sale clause, read as follows:
Acceleration. Upon the occurrence of any of the following, all
of the sums secured by this Deed of Trust shall be immediately
due and payable at the option of Lender, without notice or de-
mand, which Borrower hereby expressly waives: . . . (e) the sale
or transfer of the Property, or any part thereof or interest therein,
by Borrower without Lender's written consent .... 19
16. Bartke, Home Financing at the Crossroads-A Study of the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, 48 IND. L.J. 1, 4 (1972).
17. FEDERAL NAT'L MORTGAGE ASS'N ANN. REP. 18 (1979).
18. FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORP. ANN. REP. 28 (1979).
19. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, FEDERAL NA-
[Vol. 31:49
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A second exposure draft, dated February 3, 1971, restricted the lender's
rights in what was then covenant 17:
Acceleration. Upon the occurrence of any of the following
events of default, Lender may during the continuance of such
event, by notice to Borrower, declare the sums secured by this
Deed of Trust to be immediately due and payable without de-
mand:. . . (c) without Lender's prior written consent, the sale or
transfer by Borrower of the Property, or any part thereof or inter-
est therein, not, however, including the creation of any lien or
encumbrance subordinate to this Deed of Trust, a transfer by de-
vise or descent, or the grant of any leasehold interest of three
years or less not containing an option to purchase3 0
There were two significant differences between the two exposure drafts.
First, the second draft provided greater protection to borrowers than did
the first draft as the second draft required that notice of acceleration be
given to borrowers. Second, in the first exposure draft the default was trig-
gered by the transfer of any interest in the property, whereas the second
exposure draft eliminated three significant interest transfers from the defi-
nition of default (i e. , junior liens, transfer by will or intestate inheritance,
and short term rental).
FNMA and FHLMC sponsored a two day public meeting on April 5
and 6, 1971 in Washington, D.C. to hear the views of lenders, consumers
and legislators regarding the proposed forms. The purpose of the meeting
was identified in the opening remarks of Chairman Albert Rains, a former
Congressman who had been Chairman of the Housing Subcommittee of
the House Banking and Currency Committee. Chairman Rains stated:
Those familiar with the legislative history of the secondary
market for conventional loans . . . will agree one of the major
considerations that led Congress to authorize the program was
the need to develop so far as possible some kind of uniformity in
mortgage documents.
In developing this uniformity, however, it's imperative that to
the extent possible an evenhandedness in the rights and duties
between the borrower and the lender be achieved. 2'
Many of the forty-three individuals who presented their views at the
meetings discussed the acceleration clause. Lenders asked for at least a
retention of the rights expressed in the first exposure draft, while consumer
TIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION PUBLIC MEETING ON CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGE
FORMs, S. Doc. No. 21, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1971).
20. Id at 18.
21. Id at 1.
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representatives attacked the draft as overreaching. Legislators sided with
the consumers.
Typical of the lenders' views was the statement of Lewis S. Eaton, presi-
dent of the Fresno Guarantee Savings and Loan Association of Fresno,
California, who was then president of the United States Savings and Loan
League. Mr. Eaton stated: "[P]ermitting the lender to call the loan if he so
desires in the event of a change of ownership is in the public interest."22
John A. Spanogle, Jr., of the Public Interest Research Group, viewed the
issue somewhat differently:
Covenant 17(c) of the FNMA form permits acceleration of the
debt if borrowers sells [sic] the property, whether the lender's se-
curity interest is impaired or not. In recent times lenders have
refused to allow transfer of the property and have also refused to
make new loans. This effectively prohibits the homeowner from
selling his house during periods of tight money, making him im-
mobile in a mobile society.23
As a result of the opposition to the acceleration clause, the two corpora-
tions issued separate document forms. The FHLMC form contained a
new expanded covenant 17:
Transfer of the Property, Assumption. If all or any part of the
Property or an interest therein is sold or transferred by Borrower
without Lender's prior written consent, excluding (a) the creation
of a lien or an encumbrance subordinate to this Deed of Trust,
(b) the creation of a purchase money security interest for house-
hold appliances, (c) a transfer by devise, descent or by operation
of law upon the death of a joint tenant or (d) the grant of any
leasehold interest of three years or less not containing an option
to purchase, Lender may, at Lender's option, declare all the sums
secured by this Deed of Trust to be immediately due and paya-
ble. Lender shall have waived such option to accelerate if, prior
to the sale or transfer, Lender and the person to whom the Prop-
erty is to be sold or transferred reach agreement in writing that
the credit of such person is satisfactory to Lender and that the
interest payable on the sums secured by this Deed of Trust shall
be at such rate as Lender shall request. If Lender has waived the
option to accelerate provided in this paragraph 17 and if Bor-
rower's successor in interest has executed a written assumption
agreement accepted in writing by Lender, Lender shall release
Borrower from all obligations under this Deed of Trust and the
22. Id at 45.
23. Id at 116.
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Note.24
This provision differed from the provision in the second exposure draft
by the addition of two exclusions. A purchase money security interest for
household appliances would no longer trigger default, thus eliminating the
possibility that the purchase of a new stove on credit could constitute a
default of the first mortgage. The new language also clarified that a trans-
fer to a joint tenant by operation of law would not be considered a default.
In addition, the language of the expanded covenant 17 put the borrower
on notice that the lender could require an increase of the interest rate as a
condition to the consent to a transfer. The provision further provided that
the lender became obligated to release the original borrower from any per-
sonal liability if the purchaser signed an assumption agreement.
Mortgage forms containing the above language were distributed by
FHLMC in December 1971. The FNMA issued forms identical to those
issued by the FHLMC with two exceptions. Whether because the FNMA
was more sensitive to the public criticism voiced at the hearings, or be-
cause it read the prevailing political pressures differently, the FNMA is-
sued mortgage forms that did not include the expanded covenant 17
language and note forms that did not contain a prepayment penalty
25provision.
2
The two corporations had separate documents until June 1975.26 At that
time joint documents were released which contained the covenant 17 lan-
guage of the FHLMC form. That language remains unchanged to date.
III. STATE COURT DECISIONS DISFAVORING ENFORCEMENT
While the secondary market was developing, the state courts were com-
ing to grips with due-on-sale provisions. Typically cases arose in one of
two ways: either the issue of enforceability of the clause would be raised
by a borrower seeking a declaratory judgment to prohibit enforcement of
the clause in the face of a transfer rejected by the lender, or the issue would
be raised as a defense by a borrower who ignored the lender's refusal to
consent and was subjected to a foreclosure action. Although one goal in
the secondary market development process was uniformity, there was no
24. FHLMC Deed of Trust for California 12/7 1, Covenant 17.
25. For a complete discussion of the development of the FNMA/FHLMC Uniform
Instruments, see Jensen, Mortgage Standardization: History of Interaction of Economics, Con-
sumerism and Governmental Pressure, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 397 (1972).
26. FNMA would accept FHLMC forms provided the servicing lender agreed not to
enforce the due-on-sale provision or the prepayment penalty. FHLMC would not accept the
FNMA form in lieu of its own form.
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similar concern among the courts interpreting the various clauses before
them.
Any review of state court action in this area must of necessity start with
California. That state was one of the earliest to speak to the issue and is
looked to most frequently by other courts considering whether a due-on-
sale provision is a restraint on alienation. In Coast Bank v. Minderhout27 ,
Justice Traynor, speaking for the California Supreme Court, stated: "The
view that the common-law rule against restraints on alienation prohibits
all such restraints has been forcefully criticized on the ground that it loses
sight of the purposes of the rule and needlessly invalidates reasonable re-
straints designed to protect justifiable interests of the parties."2 The court
concluded: "In the present case it was not unreasonable for [the lender] to
condition its continued extension of credit to the [borrowers] on their re-
taining their interest in the property that stood as security for the debt."29
The California Court of Appeals, relying on Coast Bank in Hellbaum v.
Lytton Savings andLoan Association,30 stated: "It is settled that an agree-
ment not to encumber or transfer property, exacted by a lender to protect
his security interest, is not an invalid restraint on alienation."'3 1 In
Hellbaum, the lender had not expressed dissatisfaction with the proposed
transferee, but had insisted on an assumption fee equal to 5% of the
$274,000 loan. The court concluded: "[Tihe terms complained of do not
necessarily constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation. The com-
plaint does not allege that the fees proposed to be exacted were so large as
to have no reasonable relation to the justifiable interests of the lender
"932
The high watermark (or low watermark, depending on one's perspec-
tive) was reached in Cherry v. Home Savings and Loan Association.3 The
mortgage in question had a due-on-sale provision which gave the lender
the option to call the loan upon transfer, but made no reference to waiving
that right upon payment of a fee or higher rate. The savings and loan
association refused to consent to a transfer unless Cherry agreed to pay an
assumption fee and to accept an increased interest rate.
The court of appeals acknowledged and accepted the economic argu-
ments made by the lender in the following often-cited language:
27. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
28. Id at 316, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
29. Id
30. 274 Cal. App. 2d 456, 79 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1969).
31. Id at 458, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
32. Id at 459, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
33. 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969).
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[TIhe lender places some value on his belief that the person
who takes out the loan is reliable and responsible. A lender may,
indeed, be willing to loan money to some persons or entities at
one rate of interest but to other, less desirable risks only at an
increased rate.
Secondly, loan agreements frequently permit a borrower to pay
off a loan before it is due. When interest rates are high, a lender
runs the risk they will drop and that the borrower will refinance
his debt elsewhere at a lower rate and pay off the loan, leaving
the lender with money to loan but at a less favorable interest rate.
On the other hand, when money is loaned at low interest, the
lender risks losing the benefit of a later increase in rates. As one
protection against the foregoing contingency, a due-on-sale
clause is employed permitting acceleration of the due date by the
lender so that he may take advantage of rising interest rates in
the event his borrower transfers the security. This is merely one
example of ways taken to minimize risks by sensible lenders. 34
That the court of appeals in Cherry considered the due-on-sale clause
reasonable per se and entitled to automatic enforcement became evident
when the court stated: "[Home Savings and Loan Association] had the
power of free decision regarding use of its money by others, the right to
determine in its own discretion whether it would exercise its option, and it
had no obligation to act only in a manner which others might term
reasonable. 35
Two years later, in 1971, the California Supreme Court had the opportu-
nity to review the Hellbaum and Cherry rationales in La Sala v. American
Savings and Loan Association.36 That case involved a due-on-encum-
brance clause3 7 which was triggered when the borrowers took out a second
mortgage. The lender then attempted to obtain an increase of the interest
rate on the first mortgage as the price for waiving its right to accelerate the
loan.
The court distinguished the rationale behind a due-on-sale clause and a
due-on-encumbrance clause in a footnote quoting the Cherry economic ra-
tionale permitting lenders to increase rates. The court stated that, while
34. Id at 579, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
35. Id at 579-80, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
36. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
37. A due-on-encumbrance clause provides for acceleration upon the sale, conveyance,
transfer, disposition or any such encumbrance of the property. In contrast, a due-on-sale
clause provides for acceleration only upon the sale of property. Id at 869, 489 P.2d at 1115,
97 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
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the Cherry argument might be valid for the sale of a home, it was not valid
in a case such as this where a homeowner obtains a second mortgage:
Acceleration upon sale of the property, in other words, does
not seriously restrict alienation because the sale terms can, and
usually will, provide for payment of the prior trust deed.
A junior encumbrance, on the other hand, often represents
only a small fraction of the borrower's equity in the property; it
does not often provide the borrower with the means to discharge
the balance secured by the. trust deed. Thus under a due-on-en-
cumbrance clause the borrower is exposed to a detriment quite
different than that involved in a sale.38
The distinction between the due-on-sale situation and the due-on-en-
cumbrance scenario described above does not appear helpful since, for the
most part, the courts could anticipate having to decide due-on-sale cases
only where the sale terms do not provide for payment in full for the trust
deed. The distinction between Cherry and La Sala became more confus-
ing when the court continued: "In any event, a restraint on alienation can-
not be found reasonable merely because it is commercially beneficial to the
restrainor."39
Thus, the La Sala court appeared ready to disfavor Cherry, or at least to
apply some limitations on the application of lenders' rights. Nevertheless,
in summary the court stated:
[W]e have concluded that the lender may insist upon the auto-
matic performance of the due-on-sale clause because such a pro-
vision is necessary to the lender's security. We have decided,
however, that the power lodged in the lender by the due-on-en-
cumbrance clause can claim no such mechanical justification.
We sustain it only in the case of a trial court's finding that it is
reasonably necessary to the protection of the lender's security
40
At least one commentator noted the inconsistency of the court's reason-
ing in reconciling Cherry and La Sala and suggested: "For the reasons
enunciated in La Sala regarding due-on-encumbrance clauses, the due-on-
sale clause should likewise be enforced only when reasonably necessary to
protect a justifiable interest in the lender's security. ' '41
The next step in the line of cases disfavoring due-on-sale clauses oc-
38. Id at 880 n.17, 489 P.2d at 1123 n.17, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859 n.17.
39. Id at 880-81 n.17, 489 P.2d at 1123-24 n.17, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 860 n.17.
40. Id at 883-84, 489 P.2d at 1126, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
41. Comment, Applying the Brakes to Acceleration Clauses: Controlling Their Misuse in
Real Property Secured Transactions, 9 CALIF. W.L. REV. 514, 527 (1973).
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curred in 1974 when the California Supreme Court ruled, in Tucker v. Las-
sen Savings and Loan Association,42 that acceleration because of the
execution of a land sales contract "would result in a restraint on alienation
of very considerable proportions., 43 The facts of the case made it easy for
the court to focus on the economic arguments involved. Shortly after the
Tuckers purchased property with the proceeds of a loan granted by Lassen
Savings and Loan Association, the property was rented with the bank's
knowledge and apparent lack of objection. The Tuckers then attempted to
sell the property to the tenants under a land sales contract. The bank re-
fused to consent unless the tenants assumed the existing loan and the par-
ties agreed to pay an increased interest rate. When the purchasers balked,
the sales price was reduced to the outstanding balance of the mortgage at
the increased rate. Thus, the Tuckers lost the difference between the origi-
nal contract price and the amount of the mortgage.
For the first time, the court looked at the degree of restraint involved
and suggested a weighing of factors:
[Ilt is not only the justqlcation for enforcing a particular re-
straint which is relevant to the determination of whether such a
restraint is 'reasonable' within the meaning of Coast Bank; we
must also consider the quantum of restraint-that is the actual
practical effect upon alienation which would result from enforce-
ment of the restraint. . . .To the degree that enforcement of the
clause would result in an increased quantum of actual restraint
on alienation in the particular case, a greater justification for such
enforcement from the standpoint of the lender's legitimate inter-
ests will be required in order to warrant enforcement.4
In a footnote, the court suggested that it might be willing to examine the
economic justification for exercise of a due-on-sale clause in an outright
sale situation, as set forth in Cherry, but that it would extend the La Sala
reasoning to land contract situations:
We reject the suggestion that a lender's interest in maintaining
its portfolio at current interest rates justifies the restraint imposed
by the exercise of a 'due-on' clause upon the execution of an in-
stalment land contract. Whatever cogency this argument may
retain concerning the relatively mild restraint involved in the
case of an outright sale (a matter to which we do not now address
ourselves) it lacks all force in the case of the serious and extreme
restraint which would result from the automatic enforcement of
42. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
43. Id at 637, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr. 639.
44. Id at 637, 526 P.2d at 1173, 116 Cal. Rptr. 638 (emphasis in original).
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'due-on' clauses in the context of installment land contracts.45
A commentator has suggested that the distinction between the appar-
ently unrestrained rights of the lender in outright sales situations, as in
Coast Bank and Cherry, and the restrictions placed on junior liens and
land contracts in La Sala and Lassen is unnecessary. All "due on" clause
cases should be subject to the La Sala and Lassen reasoning, with the
lender bearing the burden of showing a threat to its security interest before
the clause would be enforced. '  However, the lower California courts
were unwilling to pick up the clues laid down in La Sala and Lassen. In
Medovoi v. American Savings and Loan Association,47 the court of appeals
reviewed Cherry, La Sala and Lassen and concluded that the La Sala and
Lassen restrictions were not intended to cover outright sales.48
In 1978, the California Supreme Court addressed the outright sale situa-
tion head-on, reexamining Coast Bank and Cherry in Wellenkamp v. Bank
ofAmerica.49 In a fact pattern similar to Cherry, a deed transferring title
to Ms. Wellenkamp was recorded and the Bank of America was notified.
The Bank of America responded by offering to waive its right to accelerate
in return for Ms. Wellenkamp's agreement to assume the loan with an
increase of interest from 8% to 9 1/4%. When Ms. Wellenkamp refused to
consent to the increased rate, the Bank filed a notice of default, and Ms.
Wellenkamp sought an injunction against the enforcement of the due-on-
sale provision. The lower court sustained the Bank's demurrer to the com-
plaint on the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action since automatic enforcement of a due-on-sale clause was
valid under California law.5 °
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that "a due-on clause
contained in a promissory note or deed of trust cannot be enforced upon
the occurrence of an outright sale unless the lender can demonstrate that
enforcement is reasonably necessary to protect against impairment to its se-
curity or the risk of default."'
The court specifically rejected the economic analysis of Cherry, 2 on the
assumption that due-on-sale clauses were intended solely to protect against
45. Id at 638 n.10, 526 P.2d at 1175-76 n.10, 116 Cal. Rptr. 640 n.10 (citation omitted).
46. See Comment, Half- Way Mark Reached in the Demise of the Inequitable Application
of the "Due-on-Sale" Clause, 3 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 111 (1975).
47. 62 Cal. App. 3d 317, 133 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1976).
48. 133 Cal. Rptr. at 71-72.
49. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
50. Id at 947, 582 P.2d at 972, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
51. Id at 953, 582 P.2d at 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
52. Id at 952-53, 582 P.2d at 977, 748 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
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"the risk to the lender that waste or default will occur." 53 The court con-
cluded: "[We believe that exercise of the due-on clause to protect against
this kind of business risk would not further the purpose for which the due-
on clause was legitimately designed, namely to protect against impairment
to the lender's security that is shown from a transfer of title."54
The court reached these conclusions by first examining Coast Bank, La
Sala, and Lassen. The court found that Coast Bank stood for the proposi-
tion that due-on-sale clauses were reasonable restraints on alienation if the
restraint was necessary to prevent impairment to the lender's security.55
La Sala not only required an examination of whether or not the restraint
was necessary to prevent impairment of the lender's security but also the
effect that enforcement would have on alienation. 56 Lassen required an
analysis of the practical effect upon alienation caused by enforcement, 57
such that "the greater the quantum of restraint that results from enforce-
ment of a given clause, the greater must be the justification for that
enforcement." '
The court then reviewed dicta in Lassen and La Sala which permitted
exercise of due-on-sale clauses in "outright" sales and concluded that those
cases dealt only with sales where the seller was receiving cash sufficient to
pay off the existing loan either from new financing or directly from the
buyer.5 9 The court was therefore not bound by the holding in La Sala and
Lassen in a case where a loan balance remained unpaid.
Recognizing the realities of inflation and "tight" money, the court noted
that if a lender was unwilling to permit the assumption of the loan, a pur-
chaser who was unable to obtain replacement financing might be pre-
vented from purchasing the property.' The court then discussed the
situation where the lender would be willing to allow assumption at a mar-
ket rate:
Even when the lender is willing to waive its option to acceler-
ate in return for the assumption of the existing loan at an in-
creased interest rate, an inhibitory effect on transfer may still
result. The buyer, faced with the lender's demand for increased
interest, may insist that the seller lower the purchase price. The
seller would then be forced to chose between lowering the
53. Id at 952, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
54. Id at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385 (footnote omitted).
55. Id at 948, 582 P.2d at 973, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
56. Id
57. Id at 948-49, 582 P.2d at 973, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
58. Id at 949, 582 P.2d at 973, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
59. Id at 949-50, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83.
60. Id at 950, 582 P.2d at 974-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
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purchase price and absorbing the loss with the resulting reduc-
tion in his equity interest, or refusing to go through with the sale
at all. In either event, the result in terms of a restraint on aliena-
tion is clear.61
A dissenting opinion by Justice Clark criticized the majority's reasoning
and application of the doctrines of Coast Bank, La Sala and Lassen. The
dissent was particularly critical of the economic analysis conducted by the
majority: "What the majority opinion fails to recognize is that the 're-
straint' in its hypothetical case results not from exercise of the contractual
clause but rather from the bleak and unpredictable economic conditions it
paints."62
Justice Clark concluded that the majority failed to apply its previous
decisions accurately:
The majority opinion errs first in concluding that a due-on
clause unreasonably restricts outright sale of property; errs again
in concluding there is little or no justification for the clause, con-
trary to our earlier holdings. We err again in failing to recognize
that lenders and borrowers, owners and prosepctive owners,
should be allowed to run their own affairs with minimal govern-
mental intrusion-particularly from this branch.63
Justice Clark received support from the California Court of Appeals in
Medovoi v. American Savings and Loan Association.' Medovoi, discussed
above, was pending appeal in the California Supreme Court when Wel-
lenkamp was decided and Medovoi was returned to the court of appeals for
rehearing in light of the Wellenkamp ruling. The Medovoi court found
Wellenkamp inapplicable based on an involved and unusual fact pattern.
In the sole footnote to the opinion, the court chided the supreme court for
its "short sighted" decision which failed to recognize that Californians
compete in a national market for financing:
I agree with Justice Clark in his dissenting opinion in the Wel-
lenkamp case that a due-on-sale clause does not unreasonably
restrict the outright sale of property and with his conclusion that
the majority opinion errs in concluding there is little or no justifi-
cation for the clause.
If the 'rules of the game' in respect to home financing are to be
changed as they pertain to "due-on-sale" clauses, such changes
61. Id at 950-51, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384 (footnotes omitted).
62. Id at 956, 582 P.2d at 978, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 387 (Clark, J., dissenting).
63. Id at 958, 582 P.2d at 980, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 389 (Clark, J., dissenting).
64. 89 Cal. App. 3d 244, 152 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1979).
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should certainly not come from the judiciary but should emanate
from the legislative branch of government. 65
A concurring opinion by Justice Thompson expressed the lower court's
frustration with the supreme court's decision and its failure to lay down
specific guidelines for borrowers, lenders, and lower courts.66
One commentator, tracing the history of California due-on-sale litiga-
tion,67 basically supported the direction in which the court had moved, but
questioned the lack of guidance given by the Wellenkamp court:
This point of the analysis discloses a weakness in the Wel-
lenkamp decision, for no guidelines are given as to what a 'rea-
sonable threat' to the lender's security would be. How similar
must the buyer's and seller's credit rating be? How can a lender
know that a buyer will commit waste on the property? By what
test would a buyer be a greater risk of default? Perhaps the court
thought that these questions could be best answered by a jury.
This would be consistent with the Minority Doctrine case by case
approach of determining the reasonableness of a restraint on
alienation. But without any guidelines to work from a jury will
be somewhat hampered.68
In any event, it is clear after Wellenkamp that an institutional lender in
California may not exercise a due-on-sale clause to increase interest rates,
but may use it only if it can "demonstrate that enforcement is reasonably
necessary to protect against impairment to its security or the risk of de-
fault."69 Whether a showing that the proposed transferee is a bankrupt, or
a convicted arsonist, or both, is required, or even sufficient, was left for
future determination. As a practical matter, a lender is unlikely to test the
outer limits of the due-on-sale clause. During the time it would take to
demonstrate the potential risk to its security to the satisfaction of the Cali-
fornia courts, a payment history with the transferee will develop. If that
history is unsatisfactory, foreclosure for the nonpayment will make the
due-on-sale issue moot. If that history is satisfactory, the lender's burden
would probably be insurmountable. Thus, under California law, due-on-
sale clause enforcement is for all practical purposes prohibited, except for
the clearly unqualified transferee.
Other states have effectively reached the same position as California, but
by different means. In Arizona, for example, the courts have viewed the
65. Id at 257, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
66. Id, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 583-84.
67. Comment, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America." Calfornia Adopts the "Due When Rea-
sonably Necessary Clause", 7 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 173, 174-85 (1979).
68. Id at 183-84 (emphasis in original).
69. 21 Cal. 3d 953, 582 P.2d at 977, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 386 (footnote omitted).
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issue of enforcement of due-on-sale clauses as primarily an equitable mat-
ter. In 1971, the Arizona Court of Appeals in Baltimore Lfe Insurance Co.
v. Ham 70 endorsed the view that "the parties to a mortgage and note may
enter into such agreements as they deem necessary to the transaction of
their business. ''7 When ruling on the lender's ability to enforce the clause,
however, the court said:
An action to accelerate and foreclose a mortgage being an eq-
uitable proceeding, it is not enough to allege merely that the ac-
celeration clause has been violated. Absent an allegation that the
purpose of the clause is in some respect being circumvented or
that the mortgagee's security is jeopardized, a plaintiff cannot be
entitled to equitable relief.
72
In Ham, there had been no allegation that the purpose of the clause was
being circumvented nor an indication of what the purpose was. 7' The
court clearly read the sole purpose of the clause as protection of the
lender's security against increased risk of default or waste.
By 1978, the showing required of a lender had been codified, 74 allowing
the Arizona Supreme Court to "hold that the 'due on sale' clause cannot be
enforced unless [the lender] can show that its security is jeopardized by the
transfer of the subject property without [the lender's] consent .... ,,75
Arkansas has also relied on an equitable approach. In Tucker v. Pulaski
Federal Savings & Loan Association,76 the court examined a situation
where the lender had rejected a transferee, citing as reasons: late payments
by the transferee on an existing loan with the lender, a credit report on the
70. 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971), cert. denied, 108 Ariz. 192, 494 P.2d 1322
(1972).
71. 15 Ariz. App. at 81, 486 P.2d at 192.
72. Id at 82, 486 P.2d at 193 (citations omitted).
73. Id at 80, 486 P.2d at 191-92. The clause itself did not identify its purpose, reading
"All sums due and payable under this Note .... shall become due and payable without
notice forthwith upon the conveyance of title to all or any portion of the mortgaged premises
or property, or the vesting thereof in any other manner in, one other than to Mortgagor
named herein."
74. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-806.01 (West 1974). Paragraph A reads as follows:
"Nothing in this article shall be construed to prevent or limit the right of a trustor to transfer
his interest in the trust property, or authorize a beneficiary or trustee to arbitrarily withhold
his consent to a transfer by the trustor of his interest in the trust property." Paragraph B
limits the fee a lender may charge for a transfer to the greater of $100 or 1% of the balance
due. Paragraph C restricts the lender's right to increase the interest rate to those situations
in which the transferor is released from all liability and limits the amount of the increase to
1/2 of 1% over the existing rate.
75. Patton v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 473, 478-79, 578 P.2d 152, 157-
58 (1978).
76. 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972).
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borrower which showed slow payments on other obligations, and reposses-
sion of an automobile." The court noted that the lender had not reviewed
its own previous experience with the proposed transferee prior to disap-
proval and that the lender had the credit report with the derogatory infor-
mation in its possession when the earlier loan to the transferee was made.
The court concluded that "it would be extremely unfair to hold that the
Belchers are a bad risk when they are not only current in the original loan,
but have likewise tendered the monthly payments each month on the prop-
erty purchased from Tucker."78
The court indicated "there must be legitimate grounds for refusal to ac-
cept a transfer to a particular individual or concern." 7 9 A dissenting opin-
ion by Justice Fogelman looked both at the circumstances, which included
the existence of a guaranty agreement by a previous owner, and at the
suggestion of a deterioration in the value of the property due to changes in
the neighborhood. He concluded that the lender had acted reasonably:
[T]he courts should direct their inquiry toward a determination
whether the option to accelerate was exercised in the good faith
belief that the prospect of payment or performance was impaired
and the burden of establishing lack of good faith was on the party
against whom the power has been exercised.80
In Michigan, the court of appeals refused to allow the use of a due-on-
sale provision to permit the increase of the interest rate in Nichols v. Ann
Arbor Federal Savings and Loan Association .8 While there was some dis-
cussion regarding the economic balances in cases such as Cherry, that ar-
gument was rejected because of the existence of a prepayment penalty.
Without providing a detailed analysis of its reasoning, the court decided:
"If the mortgage clause defendant seeks to enforce can be labeled a re-
straint on alienation only by expanding the restatement definition, we do
not hesitate to stretch the term to include this 'due-on-sale' clause."82 The
court went on to say that "Michigan has adopted a flexible approach in the
area of restraints; a restraint on alienation will not be enforced unless it is
found to be reasonable in a particular case."83
77. 1d at 856-57, 481 S.W.2d at 729-30.
78. Id at 858, 481 S.W.2d at 731.
79. Id at 855, 481 S.W.2d at 729.
80. Id at 861, 481 S.W.2d at 732 (Fogelman, J., dissenting).
81. 73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804, appeal denied, 400 Mich. 844 (1977). See also
notes 193-94 and accompanying text infra.
82. 73 Mich. App. at 166, 250 N.W.2d at 806.
83. Id at 168, 250 N.W.2d at 806.
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IV. STATE COURT DECISIONS ALLOWING ENFORCEMENT
California, Arizona, Arkansas and Michigan courts, as indicated above,
have placed severe burdens on lenders' exercise of due-on-sale provisions.
In this respect, they are clearly in a minority among the states that have
ruled on the issue. The following is a review of the state court decisions
allowing enforcement. Since systematic categorization, even if possible, is
not likely to be helpful, they will be discussed in chronological order.
While a majority of the states have approved the "due on" clause, they
have done so for a variety of reasons and with varying degrees of explora-
tion of the issues. A Maryland court, for example, when dealing with a
prepayment penalty provision in Chapman v. Ford,4 simply assumed the
enforceability of the clause as the clear, unambiguous language of the
mortgage contract.85
The Ohio Court of Appeals upheld the right of a lender in People's Sav-
ings Association v. Standard Industries, Inc. 86 It held that:
[A] significant element in the mortgage contract is the mortga-
gor himself, his financial responsibility and his personal attitudes.
The right of the mortgagee to protect its security by maintaining
control over the identity and financial responsibility of the pur-
chaser is a legitigate business objective and is not illegal, inequi-
table or contrary to the public policy of the state of Ohio.87
The Utah Supreme Court made short shrift of the argument that due-
on-sale clauses were contrary to public policy in Walker Bank and Trust
Co. v. Neilson .8 After citing Cherry with favor, it said, "One of the con-
clusions made by the trial judge was to the effect that the acceleration pro-
vision in the addendum to the trust deed is void as being against public
policy. In this conclusion the court erred."89
In Colorado, the due-on-sale clause was determined to be a reasonable
restraint on alienation in Malouf v. Midland Federal Savings and Loan As-
sociation.9 In language reminiscent of Cherry, the court examined the
economic rationale behind the enforcement of the clause:
We do not consider the motive of [the lender] in seeking to
84. 246 Md. 42, 227 A.2d 26 (1967).
85. Id at 51-52, 227 A.2d at 11.
86. 22 Ohio App. 2d 35, 257 N.E.2d 406 (1970). The Ohio Supreme Court reserved
judgment on the enforceability of the due-on-sale clause in Great Northern Sav. Co. v. In-
garra, 66 Ohio St. 2d 503, 423 N.E.2d 128 (1981), finding that the lender was estopped from
enforcement because of delay and other conduct.
87. 22 Ohio App. 2d at 38, 257 N.E.2d at 407.
88. 26 Utah 2d 383, 490 P.2d 328 (1971).
89. Id at 385, 490 P.2d at 329.
90. 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973).
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protect itself and the borrower from the effects of inflationary or
deflationary conditions in the money market to be improper or
unlawful. Both parties have the benefit of their original bargain
during their continued creditor-debtor relationship. However,
when the property is sold to a purchaser who desires to assume
the existing loan, economic consideration [sic] may reasonably
justify the lender in raising the interest rate to or approaching
one equal to the current market rate.9'
Limitations were placed on the lender's ability to exercise its rights
under a due-on-sale clause by the Colorado legislature for loans executed
on or after July 1, 1975.92 Lenders can accelerate the loan only if they
reasonably determine the transferee is a poor credit risk based on stan-
dards used by mortgage lenders in similar circumstances. Fees charged
are restricted to no more than 0.5% of the unpaid balance of the loan.
Finally, and most significantly, interest rate increases are restricted to 1%
above the existing rate of the loan.
A constitutional amendment93 regarding the due-on-sale provision was
submitted to the Colorado voters in November 1980. This amendment
would have prohibited lenders from accelerating a mortgage upon the
transfer of the property, so long as the original borrower remained liable
and there was no substantial impairment to the lender's security as a result
of the transfer. This proposed amendment was overwhelmingly defeated,
and the due-on-sale clause remains enforceable in Colorado, subject to the
restrictions noted above.
Tennessee has clearly upheld the lender's right to increase interest rates
upon the sale of the mortgaged property. In Gunther v. White,94 the court
said: "[Elquity should not depart from the law which requires it to enforce
valid contracts and strike down the acceleration option simply because its
exercise will let the appellees, not the appellants, make the profit on the
91. Id at 303, 509 P.2d at 1245.
92. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 38-30-165 (Supp. 1980).
93. Proposition 4-The question presented to the voters was as follows:
Shall Article XVIII of the Constitution of the State of Colorado be amended to
provide that in order that all persons shall have the right to sell or transfer their
real estate or any interest herein subject to existing financing, no person or lending
institution with a security interest in the real estate shall accelerate or mature the
indebtedness secured by such real estate or alter the terms and conditions of the
indebtedness or security interest because of such sale or transfer, so long as the
original debtor remains directly responsible for the indebtedness and the security
for the indebtedness is not substantially impaired by the sale or transfer?
(Nov. 4, 1980).
94. 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
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interest rate occasioned by the increased cost of money."95
In Illinois, the lender's right to exercise the due-on-sale clause was up-
held in Baker v. Loves Park Savings and Loan Association. 96 The supreme
court concluded that "the restraint contained in the mortgage in this case is
permissible because it is a reasonable restraint, that is, one for which sound
and convincing reason exists." '97 The court also enforced a provision in the
note for an increase of the interest rate of 1% upon any default. A lender's
right to increase the rate is restricted in Illinois by the usury law.9 8
The Wisconsin Supreme Court had held "that a due-on-sale clause...
is not against public policy and is enforceable as a contractual condition of
the note and mortgage."99 However, the court has used its equitable pow-
ers to stay enforcement in cases when enforcement was inappropriate.
Thus, in Mutual Federal Savings and Loan Association v. American Medical
Services," ° the court allowed a transferee to raise a defense of laches to
prevent acceleration under a due-on-sale provision.
The North Carolina decision in Crockett v. First Federal Savings and
Loan Association1 'o provides a detailed analysis of the reasons for uphold-
ing the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses. The Crockett court noted
that events that would trigger the clause were solely within the discretion
of the borrower and that, in the absence of a prepayment penalty, the bor-
rower was also free to refinance the loan if interest rates fell. Thus, even
with a due-on-sale provision, the borrower was in a superior position. The
court noted:
Plaintiff would not have to wait for an alienation of the prop-
erty before being permitted to take advantage of changed interest
rates. Thus, as between plaintiff-trustor-borrower and defend-
ant-beneficiary-lender, plaintiff is in a more favorable position
for taking advantage of fluctuations in interest rates assuming the
due-on-sale clause is permissible. If the due-on-sale clause is not
95. Id at 532.
96. 61 I. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
97. Id at 125, 333 N.E.2d at 4 (citing Volkmer, infra note 206, at 763).
98. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 74, § 4(2)(d) (Supp. 1980). The impact of the Depository Insti-
tutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132
(1980), is a question which is beyond the scope of this paper. Briefly, § 501 of the Act
preempts state usury laws for first mortgages made by most mortgage lenders. States have
until April 1, 1983, to explicitly reimpose usury limits or the preemption remains effective.
A detailed study of both the Illinois and federal statute would be necessary to determine the
status of this situation. To date, Illinois has not explicitly reimposed its usury statute.
99. Mutual Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 58 Wis. 2d 99, 205
N.W.2d 762, 769 (1973).
100. 66 Wis. 2d 210, 223 N.W.2d 921 (1974).
101. 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976).
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permissible, the plaintiff would have an even superior position.° 2
Contrary to courts that viewed the sole purpose of the clause as provid-
ing protection to the lender against increased risk of default, °3 the North
Carolina court felt that, "under the circumstance of this case where there
were no prepayment penalties, it was appropriate to exercise the due-on-
sale clause even though the security of the lender was not threatened."'"
Although the language of the clause did not specifically put the bor-
rower on notice that assumption might be permitted only at an increased
rate, the court found the contract unambiguous, since there were no stated
restrictions on the lender's exercise of its rights.'05 The court placed mini-
mal restrictions on the enforcement of a due-on-sale clause:
[I]n the absence of allegations and proof that the lender acted
fraudulently, inequitably, oppressively or unconscionably in its
demand for increased interest rates in return for the lender's con-
sent to the sale, then the exercise of the due-on-sale clause is rea-
sonable and not invalid as a restraint on alienation.'0°
As early as 1968, the New Jersey courts had assumed the enforceability
of a due-on-sale provision in a construction loan agreement. 107 In 1976,
the issue was dealt with directly in Century Federal Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation v. Van Glahn.108 This case involved an acceleration of the mort-
gage upon the recordation of a land contract. When the borrower refused
to pay an increased interest rate, the lender started foreclosure proceed-
ings. The court concluded that the execution of the contract was sufficient
to trigger the clause. The defendant's suggestion, that the reasoning of the
California court in Lassen "° be applied, was rejected when the court
noted that California had a statute forbidding unreasonable restraints on
alienation and that "New Jersey has no such statutory authority nor, as
recited above, does our case law prohibit this 'restraint' as unreasona-
102. Id at 626, 224 S.E.2d at 585.
103. The court cites to Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d
725 (1972); Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1974); La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr.
849 (1971); Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. Ct. App. 1970); Baker v. Loves Park
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Ill. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975) as examples of such decisions.
104. 289 N.C. at 630, 224 S.E.2d at 587.
105. Id at 631, 224 S.E.2d at 588.
106. Id at 630-31, 224 S.E.2d at 587.
107. See Shalit v. Investors Say. & Loan Ass'n, 101 N.J. Super. 283, 244 A.2d 151 (1968)
(lender's right to charge $14,635 to assume $320,000 construction loan upheld). Parol evi-
dence regarding a lending officer's assurances at the time of the original agreement was not
admitted.
108. 144 N.J. Super. 48, 364 A.2d 558 (1976).
109. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
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ble." " Finally, the court suggested that not only did the lending associa-
tion have a right to insist upon an increased interest rate, it might have an
obligation to do so. The court explained:
By the enforcement of the acceleration clause in this case, [the
lender] seeks only to protect itself and its members from the infla-
tionary and deflationary conditions of the money market. Such a
motive is neither unlawful nor improper. The officers and direc-
tors of a savings and loan association have afiduciary obligation to
their depositors to obtain the best lawful yield of their mortgage
port/olio. This court will not interfere with the discretion of the
officers and directors in these matters unless such discretion is
grossly abused.III
In Fidelity Land Development Corp. v. Rieder & Sons Building & Develop-
ment Co. ,'112 the court indicated that there were limitations on the discre-
tion that a lender could exercise. In this case, title to vacant land awaiting
development was transferred for nominal consideration from the owner
corporation to its principal stockholder. The lender contended that this
transfer accelerated the due date of the loan. Prior to this allegation, how-
ever, the shareholder had conveyed title back to the corporation.
After citing Van Glahn and another case" 13 in which seemingly auto-
matic enforcement of similar provisions was allowed, the court noted,
"[Nleither of these two cases involved facts, such as those presented in this
matter, precluding the existence of any threat to the lender's security."
114
It should be noted, however, that the lender was not an institutional lender
in this case. Whether taking advantage of the business opportunity
presented here, despite the lack of any threat to the lender's security,
would be considered an institutional lender's fiduciary obligation or abuse
of discretion is not clear.
Nevada has permitted the automatic enforcement of the clause when
there is an outright sale."I5 The Nevada court viewed the enforceability of
the clause as a basic contract question: "[W]e do not suggest that the
clause is absolutely enforceable without regard to surrounding circum-
stances. We would merely attach the same reverence to the due-on-sale
clause as is accorded to any other provision which may appear in a
110. 144 N.J. Super. at 54, 364 A.2d at 561.
111. Id at 55, 364 A.2d at 562 (emphasis added).
112. 151 N.J. Super. 502, 377 A.2d 691 (1977).
113. Poydan Inc. v. Agia Kiriaki, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 141, 325 A.2d 838 (1974) (acceler-
ation allowed upon attempted transfer of both title to restaurant and liquor license).
114. 151 N.J. Super. at 510, 377 A.2d at 695.
115. First Commercial Tite, Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271 (1976).
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contract."1 16
In New York, however, the clause is presumptively enforceable, but the
courts have not hesitated to employ their equitable powers to prevent
abuses. The recent case of Silver v. Rochester Savings Bank II may be read
as both a continuation of the strict enforcement of the language of the
contract favored in earlier cases"s and an exercise of the powers of a court
to prevent an inequitable result. It is also possible, however, to read the
case as questioning the lender's right to use a due-on-sale clause to protect
its portfolio yield.'
The fact pattern in this case was so specialized that general conclusions
should be made very hesitantly. The bank approached Silver and ar-
ranged for the construction of a branch building, to its specifications, on
land owned by Silver. Financing for the construction was provided to Sil-
ver by the bank, with principal and interest fixed for twenty years. The
bank leased the building for twenty years at a fixed rental, with an option
to renew for an additional twenty years and the right of first refusal to
purchase the building in the event of a potential sale. When Silver at-
tempted to sell the property to a financially sound purchaser, the bank
chose to exercise its option to accelerate the loan, with the intention of
increasing the interest rate to a level that would require a monthly princi-
pal and interest payment on the mortgage in excess of the monthly rent
paid by the bank.
The court looked at the intent of the parties under the unusual facts
recited above and concluded that the normal inference was that the lender
was concerned solely with its security: "To construe it as granting to the
lender an unlimited right to decline to accept a grantee for any reason,
including the lender's refusal to consent to a change of the mortgage con-
tract by increasing the rate of interest, is a giant step. .... 120
In language not clearly identified as being restricted to the special cir-
cumstances of the case, the court explained: "With much sympathy for the
bank's position, we conclude that as a matter of law it cannot use the ap-
proval clause as a weapon to protect itself against the changed interest-
116. Id at 365, 550 P.2d at 1272.
117. 73 A.D.2d 81, 424 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1980).
118. Mutual Real Estate Inv. Trust v. Buffalo Say. Bank, 90 Misc. 2d 675, 395 N.Y.S.2d
583 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Stith v. Hudson City Say. Inst., 63 Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup.
Ct. 1970).
119. This case actually involved an approval clause which allows the lender to evaluate
the potential buyer and to approve or disapprove a sale to that buyer. If the seller sells
without the lender's approval, the lender may demand payment of the balance. For all prac-
tical purposes, the approval clause in this case was equivalent to a due-on-sale clause.
120. 73 A.D.2d at 84, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
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market conditions."' 12 1 In a footnote to the above language, the court sug-
gested that, had the contract expressly provided for the bank's right to in-
crease the rate, a different question would be presented: "Then, at least,
the mortgagor would have had clear notice of the bank's asserted right,
and there is authority that the provisions, exercised in good faith, would be
valid." 122
A better interpretation of the case is probably to assume that the court
intended to affirm the presumption of enforceability. The court referred to
paragraph twelve of the mortgage which reads, "[W]here any of the terms
...of the mortgage require the approval. . . or consent of Mortgagee
* . . [it] shall not be unreasonably withheld . . . by Mortgagee."' 2  The
court relied on this contractual agreement not to unreasonably withhold
consent and indicated that under New York law such an agreement would
not be implied. At least one lower New York court has interpreted Silver
as limited to its unusual circumstances and not as an invalidation of the
due-on-sale clause.' 24
In the only reported Pennsylvania case dealing with the issue, the court
assumed enforceability, stating:
[T]he validity and enforceability of 'acceleration' clauses are
not here questioned. Generally, a provision in a mortgage agree-
ment according the mortgagee the option to accelerate the matur-
ity of the mortgage debt, under certain conditions or upon the
happening of specified events, is regarded as a legitimate contrac-
tual stipulation.125
Alabama is somewhat unique in that it represents the only state in which
a court decision restricting the lender's right to increase interest rates has
been overruled. Due-on-sale clauses had been favored in Alabama since
1907.126 However, in 1977, in First Federal Savings and Loan Association v.
Britton,2 7 the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals ruled that, unless there is
an explicit indication in the mortgage instrument that refusal to agree to an
increase of the interest rate might be the sole reason for withholding con-
sent to transfer, the lender could not withhold consent to the transfer.
In Tierce v. APS Co. ,128 the Alabama Supreme Court found the holding
121. Id at 83-84, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
122. Id at 84 n.2, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 947 n.2.
123. Id at 83, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
124. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Jenkins, 441 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1981).
125. Ministers and Missionaries Benefit Bd. v. Goldsworthy, 253 Pa. Super. Ct. 321, 385
A.2d 358, 362 (1978).
126. Tidewater v. Wittmeier, 150 Ala. 253, 43 So. 782 (1907).
127. 345 So.2d 300, 304 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
128. 382 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1979).
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of the court of civil appeals in Britton to be in error. After discussing the
suitable review that due-on-sale clauses would receive in any foreclosure
proceeding, the court said, "We cannot, however, agree that the desire of a
lender to terminate loans upon transfers, due to rising interest rates, is not
a valid business purpose, thus rendering a 'due-on-sale' clause unconscion-
able and unenforceable when such desire is the primary purpose for
acceleration." 12
9
Nebraska is one of the most recent state supreme courts to address the
issue in Occidental Savings and Loan Association v. Venco. 13 0 The court
reviewed the actions taken in other jurisdictions and stated, "We believe
that the error committed by most jurisdictions in deciding this matter is
their willingness to assume that a 'due on sale' clause is a restraint on
alienation and that the only issue is reasonableness."''
After reviewing the Restatement of Property definition of restraint on
alienation and concluding that the clause is not a direct restraint, 32 the
court took issue with other courts that have found an indirect restraint.
The Wellenkamp "'33 decision, in particular, came in for a large share of
criticism:
Relatively few legal principles are relied upon as authority.
The decision is based primarily on considerations of social need
and the assumed effect of a 'due-on-sale' clause in the market-
place. The rights and needs of the seller, as seen by the court, are
detailed and balanced against the rights and needs of the lender,
as seen by the court. The court concludes that the rights and
needs of the seller outweigh those of the lender, notwithstanding
the fact that the parties have freely entered into a contract to the
contrary. ...
Decisions such as Wellenkamp place an unreasonable burden
upon lenders and call upon courts to act as periodic arbitrators in
the sale of real estate.' 34
The court then reviewed the argument that the clause was contrary to
public policy. After noting the importance of viable savings and loan as-
sociations to mortgage lending, it concluded:
Balancing portfolio return with cost of money is an important
129. 382 So. 2d at 487-88.
130. 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980).
131. Id at 471, 293 N.W.2d at 845.
132. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 404 (1944). See text accompanying note 195 infra.
133. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978). See notes 49-69 and accom-
panying text supra.
134. 206 Neb. at 476-77, 293 N.W.2d at 847.
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factor in the survival of lending associations. The due on sale
clause is an important device in maintaining that balance ...
We are cited to no authority, nor are we able to find any, which
would legally justify declaring a contract provision such as the
one in the instant case, generally referred to as a 'due on sale'
clause, to be contrary to public policy and void. 35
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts also has criticized the
Wellenkamp court for its reasoning. 136 The Massachusetts court deter-
mined that since the mortgage could have been payable on demand from
the outset without being an unreasonable restraint on alienation, making
the note payable on demand only upon sale of the property was not unrea-
sonable. The court viewed the issue as between the borrower on the one
hand and the depositors of the savings bank on the other and found the
balance in favor of protecting the interests of depositors. There was also
serious concern expressed about the ability of a Massachusetts-chartered
institution to compete effectively with a federally-chartered savings and
loan association.' 37
Finally, the Wyoming Supreme Court recently gave implied approval of
due-on-sale clause enforcement when it ruled that acceleration upon trans-
fer of title was not permitted in the absence of a due-on-sale provision.
38
V. STATE COURT DECISIONS LEAVING DOUBT AS TO ENFORCEMENT
While there is great disparity among the states discussed so far, there is
at least some degree of clarity within each of those states as to the enforce-
ability of the due-on-sale clause on a "routine" basis. Thus, one could
safely say that enforcement is not permitted in California, Arizona, Arkan-
sas and Michigan, absent a showing of unusual circumstances. Among the
other states discussed (with the exception of Colorado and Illinois where
legislatively-imposed restrictions have limited the practice of increasing in-
terest rates), the clause is presumptively enforceable, with the presumption
subject to rebuttal on equitable grounds. There is, however, a third group
of states where reasonable doubts exist as to whether the clause is consid-
ered valid and, if it is, whether there are any restrictions on the
enforcement.
In Washington, an interest rate increase of 0.5% upon transfer was per-
mitted in Miller v. Pacfic First Federal Savings and Loan Association.13 9
135. Id at 480-81, 293 N.W.2d at 849.
136. Dunham v. Ware Say. Bank, Mass. Adv. Sh. 1607 (1981).
137. See discussion of federal preemption, notes 179-194 and accompanying text infra.
138. Young v. Hawks, 624 P.2d 235 (Wyo. 1981).
139. 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d 546 (1976).
[Vol. 31:49
Due-On-Sale Clause
The due-on-sale provision in that case specifically provided for the lender
to exercise an option to either accelerate the balance or increase the inter-
est rate by no more than 2% if the title passed or the property was vacated.
The court held: "[A] loan agreement provision that permits the lender to
increase the interest rate upon transfer of the mortgaged property, even
without a showing of increased risk to the lender, is not invalidper se as an
unreasonable restraint of the free alienation of property."' a
The court focused on the language of the clause providing for the inter-
est rate increases when it said: "[Aippelants and respondent both volunta-
rily agreed to all the terms of the note and mortgage. Nothing suggests
that there was any duress, misrepresentation or overreaching on the part of
the respondent." '
Shortly after deciding Miller, the Washington Supreme Court addressed
the issue of the use of a due-on-sale clause where title was being trans-
ferred under a land contract. In Bellingham First Federal Savings andLoan
Association v. Garrison,142 the court found the reasoning of the California
Supreme Court in Lassen 43 persuasive. The court explained that "[w]e
therefore hold the due-on-sale clause before us to be an unreasonable re-
straint on alienation unless the respondent can show that the enforcement
of the clause is necessary to protect the lender's security."' After review-
ing the facts, the court found the lender had made the necessary showing
and allowed enforcement.
The court distinguished its Miller holding:
Our Miller decision concerned only a portion of the due-on-
sale clause which permitted the lender to increase the mortgage
interest on the loan when the mortgaged property was trans-
ferred. The clause in this case does not give respondent the right
to increase the interest rate upon transfer of the property. It is an
acceleration clause.' 4
5
Taking Miller and Bellingham together, it is clear that a contract provi-
sion specifying an increase of the interest rate by a stated amount upon
transfer of title is enforceable. It is almost as clear that a clause that pro-
vides for acceleration but is silent regarding an interest rate increase may
be used to protect the lender's security, but may not be used solely to in-
crease the interest rate. It is not clear whether a clause such as that con-
140. Id at 405, 545 P.2d at 549.
141. Id at 406, 545 P.2d at 549.
142. 87 Wash. 2d 437, 553 P.2d 1090 (1976).
143. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
144. 87 Wash. 2d at 441, 553 P.2d at 1092.
145. Id at 439, 553 P.2d at 1091.
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tained in the FNMA/FHLMC Deed of Trust may be used to increase the
rate because, while the borrower is placed on notice that an increase of rate
is possible, the magnitude of that increase is not limited.
Although the Florida Supreme Court has not ruled on the matter, there
were four Florida District Courts of Appeal decisions between 1970 and
1976. The first of these cases, Clark v. Lachenmeier, 146 involved an in-
artfully-worded clause which attempted to permit the lender to review the
credit of any transferee but did not provide for acceleration if the credit
rating was unsatisfactory.' 47 The Second District Court noted that the
lender had not demonstrated that the security had been imparied and up-
held the trial court, saying: "We believe the Court was correct in denying
foreclosure merely because the mortgage called for the consent of the
mortgagee before property can be sold to a third party, where no harip has
resulted to mortgagee from such a conveyance."' 141
The Fourth District Court made a very careful reading of the contract
provision the following year in Home Federal Savings and Loan Association
v. English.149 The court noted that the warranty deed by which the trans-
fer was effectuated contained a provision that the grantee assumed the ob-
ligation of the mortgage. The court then noted that this clause required
two conditions to allow the mortgagee to accelerate conveyance without
written consent and without assumption. Since the transferee had as-
sumed the obligation by the terms of the warranty deed, one of these con-
ditions was lacking and acceleration was not permitted.
Another close reading of the instruments was made in Stockman v.
Burke.'50 The clause was actually contained in a purchase money mort-
gage, but the parties and the court agreed that it had become part of the
terms of the note since the note and mortgage were executed contempora-
neously and the instruments referred to each other. In allowing accelera-
tion, the Second District Court made it clear that there were significant
differences between the suit on the note before it and the alternative of a
foreclosure of the mortgage:
In this suit at law upon a promissory note, there was no more
reason for the court to nullify the provision for payment upon
resale of the property than there would have been to otherwise
146. 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
147. The clause read, "It is hereby agreed that in the event of the transfer of ownership
of the above described property that the Mortgagee has the right and privilege of accepting
or rejecting, or passing on credit, etc., of such successor in ownership." Id at 584.
148. Id at 585.
149. 249 So. 2d 707 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
150. 305 So. 2d 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
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vary the time of payment which was agreed upon by the par-
ties. . . We leave open until another day the question of
whether a mortgage with a similar provision can be accelerated
and foreclosed upon the sale of the property without a showing
that the mortgagee has been prejudiced by reason of the convey-
ance to the new owner.' 5'
In Chopan v. Klinkman,'52 the Fourth District Court found that a trans-
fer made by means of a land contract did not trigger a provision which was
dependent upon a sale. Perhaps it was summarizing the view of all the
Florida courts that had ruled on the issue when it explained: "While an
acceleration clause is a valid contractual provision, in enforcing such a
clause, a court of equity should require the showing of a clear unequivocal
right to forthwith call due the balance of the debt."' 53
The sole Mississippi decision on the matter, Sanders v. Hicks,154 in-.
volved a loan, secured by a service station, which contained no provision
for the payment of interest until default. The lender's attempt to prevent
transfer of title and accelerate the debt was disfavored by the court:
[W]e hold that such restraints are not per se invalid, and that
such a restraint may be valid depending upon whether it is rea-
sonable under the circumstances.
We hold that the restraint on alienation in the deed of trust
involved in this case, which has no relation to any threat to the
legitimate interests of the mortgagee, is invalid. As to what
would constitute a threat to a mortgagee's legitimate interests is
not before us; the development of the law in this respect must
abide future cases.' 55
The court's failure to provide any guidance as to what constitutes a
"mortgagee's legitimate interests" left borrowers and lenders uncertain as
to their respective rights. One commentator has cautioned: "The courts
have assumed the task of steering an uncertain course through an area
where 'predictability of judicial result' is of paramount importance."'1 56
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Continental Federal Savings and Loan
Association v. Feter,1' 7 dealt with a somewhat different aspect of the usual
151. Id at 90.
152. 330 So. 2d 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
153. Id at 156.
154. 317 So. 2d 61 (Miss. 1975).
155. Id at 64.
156. Note, Deeds of Trust-Restraints Against Alienation--Due-on Clause is an Unreason-
able Restraint on Alienation Absent a Showing of Protection of Mortgagee's Legitimate Inter-
ests (Sanders v. Hicks, Miss. 1975), 47 Miss. L.J. 331, 346 (1976).
157. 564 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1977).
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fact pattern. There the challenge was to the lender's practice of charging a
fee for the consent to transfer. The normal fee was $100, but, if the ex-
isting interest rate was below market, the lender charged a one time fee
equal to 1% of the outstanding loan balance. The actual cost to the lender
of making the necessary changes to its records was conceded to be approxi-
mately $100. The court was apparently impressed by both the lack of lan-
guage in the mortgage agreement referring to such a fee and by what it
apparently took to be the purpose of a due-on-sale clause:
Acceleration clauses are bargained-for elements of mortgages
and notes to protect the mortgagee from risks connected with
transfer of the mortgaged property. The underlying rationale for
an acceleration clause is to insure that a responsible party is in
possession, to protect the mortgagee from unanticipated risks,
and to afford the lender the right to be assured of the safety of his
security. However, an action to accelerate and foreclose a mort-
gage is an equitable proceeding and the equitable powers of the
court will not be invoked to impose an extreme penalty on a
mortgagor with no showing that he has violated the substance of
the agreement. 5 8
It is not clear whether the Oklahoma court would look favorably upon a
lender's right to protect itself from the risk of changed money market con-
ditions by providing for an option to increase the interest rate upon trans-
fer of title, or whether the sole rationale it would accept for allowing
acceleration "is to insure that a responsible party is in possession."1 59
The Oregon Supreme Court, while not dealing with the due-on-sale
clause directly, was asked to analogize the reasoning of the California
Court in Lassen 6o to hold that a restriction on prepayment for ten years
was an unreasonable restraint on alienation. In Hartford Life Insurance
Co. v. Randall, 6' the court refused to adopt the Lassen analogy, calling
the restriction on the right to prepay for ten years "a trade off of commer-
cially beneficial interests ... ."162 The court's reasoning did not suggest
how it might rule if the issue before it was actually a due-on-sale provision.
The final state court decision to be noted is a recent Louisiana Court of
Appeals decision 6" dealing with a provision similar to the
FNMA/FHLMC uniform covenant 17 provision. The validity of the
clause itself was not in question since Louisiana statutory law gives savings
158. Id at 1017.
159. Id
160. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
161. 282 Or. 297, 583 P.2d 1126 (1978).
162. Id at 298, 583 P.2d at 1127.
163. Rayford v. Louisiana Sav. Ass'n, 380 So. 2d 1232 (La. Ct. of App. 1980).
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and loan associations the right to enforce a due-on-sale provision. The
lender, however, had attempted to impose a fee of 1% of the unpaid bal-
ance of a $700,000 nursing home mortgage to permit the transfer of title
from three individual owners to one of the individuals. The court refused
to allow the imposition of the fee, ruling that the clause and the statute
anticipated the introduction of new parties and that, in effect, there was no
transfer under the facts of the case.' 64
VI. STATE STATUTES LIMITING ENFORCEMENT
As previously indicated, Arizona and Colorado statutes dealing with the
transfer of real estate limit the amount a lender may increase the interest
rate to 0.5% and 1% respectively. 65 A New Mexico statute 66 makes unen-
forceable any provision in a mortgage secured by a one to four family
residence that provides for either acceleration of the indebtedness or an
increase of the interest rate, upon the transfer of any interest by the mort-
gagor, unless the security interest is substantially impaired.
A subsequently changed Minnesota law eliminated a lender's right to
exercise a due-on-sale provision if the original loan was a purchase money
conventional mortgage on a one to four family dwelling used as the bor-
rower's primary residence. The lender had to consent to the transfer so
long as the original borrower remained liable for the repayment of the
indebtedness. The lender had to release the original borrower and allow
the transfer "if the transferee (1) meets the standards of credit worthiness
normally used by persons in the business of making conventional loans
...and (2) executes an agreement. . . assumling] the obligations of the
existing borrower."'' 67 At least in part due to pressure from FHLMC,
FNMA and local lenders, the statute was amended in May 1981 to permit
an interest rate increase to the current rate charged by the lender but no
more than the most recently published FNMA monthly index of auction
yields.' 68
A Georgia statute 169 is similar to the former Minnesota law. The statute
limits a lender's right to accelerate because a transfer is limited to only
those situations in which the transferee does not intend to occupy the prop-
erty as a principal residence and where occupancy is required by a federal
regulator of the lender. Increases of the interest rate are permitted only
164. Id at 1237-39.
165. See notes 74 & 92 and accompanying text supra.
166. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-7-12 (1978).
167. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.20(6) (1970 & Supp. 1981).
168. Id § 47.20(6a).
169. GA. CODE ANN. § 67-3002 (1967 & Supp. 1981).
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when the original borrower requests a release from all liability and the
lender grants the release. Interest rate increases, moreover, are limited to
no more than 1% above the existing rate and cannot be increased more
frequently than once every two years. The lender, when asked to release
the original borrower, may disapprove the credit worthiness of the trans-
feree, but the lender is held to "standards normally used by persons in the
business of making loans on real estate in the same or similar circumstance
.. *..",7o If the transferee is unwilling to pay the increased rate, the loan
may be prepaid without penalty within sixty days. Limitations are also
placed on the amount of fees that the lender may charge. The law is appli-
cable to all residential loans other than apartments, motels, hotels, and
nursing homes for which the original amount is less than $100,000. A 1981
amendment permits lenders to accelerate the loan if they reasonably deter-
mine that the proposed transferee is financially incapable of meeting the
payments, provided there is a due-on-sale provision in the controlling
instruments. '7'
The Minnesota and Georgia laws are unusual in that they provide the
mortgagor an absolute right to transfer title, without regard for the credit
worthiness of the transferee, so long as the original borrower remains lia-
ble. This can have a major impact on a lender forced to accept a borrower
with unworthy credit which could severely impact the value of the secured
property. In any event, the significance placed on personal liability by the
Minnesota and Georgia legislatures seems out of proportion to its benefit,
since the original borrower is likely to have recovered his entire equity at
the time of the transfer, removing any incentive to see that the payments
are made, and may be beyond the reach of the local courts.
An Iowa statute affecting purchase money mortgages secured by one or
two family residences prohibits the enforcement of due-on-sale provisions
if the transferee intends to use the property as a residence. 72 An exception
is made, however, if the lender reasonably believes, based on the same
criteria used to evaluate a new mortgage loan application, that "its security
interest or the likelihood of repayment is impaired."' 173 Under such cir-
cumstances, the lender may either accelerate the loan or "adjust the inter-
est rate, the repayment schedule or the term of the loan."' 74
Another provision of Iowa law, 17 - not restricted by property type or us-
170. Id § 67-3002(a)(6).
171. 1981 Ga. Laws 480-85.
172. IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.8 (1950 & Supp. 1981).
173. Id § 535.8(c).
174. Id
175. Id § 535.8(e).
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age, increases the normal redemption period after foreclosure if the fore-
closure results from the enforcement of a due-on-sale provision. This
section, which became effective in 1980, is applicable to any foreclosure
occurring after enactment, regardless of the date the loan was made. An
exception is made if the lender establishes, based on criteria no more re-
strictive than those used to evaluate new mortgage loan applications, that
either the security interest or the likelihood of repayment is impaired by
the transfer.
As indicated previously' 76 in the discussion of the state law in Illinois,
the preemption of state usury laws, by the Depository Institutions Deregu-
lation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 [the Act],' 77 may give rise to
questions concerning restrictions contained in usury laws. The Act
preempts state usury laws for most first mortgage transactions. It is likely
that lenders will argue that restrictions of rate increases contained in such
laws are as invalid as any other restriction. No doubt the courts will be
asked to deal with this issue at some time.
South Carolina is another jurisdiction where that issue may be raised.
One statute 7 8 prohibits a change of the initial interest rate for mortgage
loans without the agreement of the borrower. In any event, the rate cannot
be increased by more than 1%. This provision is applicable to all loans of
$100,000 or less, regardless of property type and usage.
VII. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
The disparity of the approaches taken to the question of due-on-sale
enforcement by the various jurisdictions has a chilling effect on the crea-
tion of a national secondary market. The issue is complicated even fur-
ther, however, since the identity of the lender has become significant.
The Home Owner's Loan Act of 19331 authorized the creation of a
system of federal savings and loan associations as well as the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board to regulate them. The Board's authority to pre-
empt state regulation of federal savings and loan associations in the area of
fair lending practices was affirmed in Conference of Federal Savings and
Loan Associations v. Stein. '
A 1948 regulation' adopted by the Board required each loan contract
176. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
177. Act of Mar. 31, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified in scattered
sections of 12, 15 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1980)).
178. S.C. CODE § 34-31-90(2) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
179. 12 U.S.C. § 1461, -62, -64, -65, -66(a), -68 (1976).
180. 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979), a~fd men, 445 U.S. 921 (1980).
181. Current version at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11 (1980).
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of a federal association to provide for full protection to the association. In
1975, a United States District Court asked the Board to construe the regu-
lation, to determine if it permitted federal savings and loan associations to
employ a due-on-sale clause to update their portfolios.' 2 The Board's Of-
fice of Economic Research issued an advisory opinion 8 3 approving the use
of the clause and giving three reasons for its desirability. In the Board's
view, the clause enabled an association to: (1) ensure the credit worthiness
of the purchaser of the property; (2) adjust its mortgage portfolio yields to
current market levels; and (3) sell its mortgages in the secondary mortgage
market, thereby generating funds for investment in other mortgages.
In April 1976, the Board issued new regulations specifically authorizing
federal savings and loan associations to employ a due-on-sale provision
and providing that the exercise of an option to accelerate by the associa-
tion "shall be exclusively governed by the terms of the loan contract [be-
tween the association and the borrower], and all rights and remedies of the
association and borrower [respecting such acceleration] shall be fixed and
governed by that contract." 8 4 The regulation language expressed the view
that the Board considered the authority to include a due-on-sale provision
to be the continuation of an existing power.
For loans made after July 31, 1976, an association was not permitted to
exercise the option to accelerate if the property was occupied by the bor-
rower as a home and the transaction involved was one of the four excep-
tions contained in the FNMA/FHLMC covenant 17: (1) creation of a
junior lien or encumbrance; (2) creation of a purchase money security in-
terest for household appliances; (3) transfer by devise, descent or operation
of law upon the death of a joint tenant; or (4) leasehold of three years or
less without an option to purchase.' 8 5 The regulations further provided
that no prepayment penalty could be collected if the association had exer-
cised its option to accelerate and required the lender to release the original
borrower from any liability where a transferee with an acceptable credit
rating assumed the obligation at the new, agreed-upon rate. The regula-
tions have effectively codified the provisions of uniform covenant 17 of the
FNMA/FHLMC mortgage for all federal savings and loan associations.
Recently several courts have addressed the question of whether the
Bank Board's regulations preempt state law that imposes a more restrictive
use of the due-on-sale provision. All of the federal courts that have ruled
182. Schott v. Mission Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. CV-75-366 WMB (C.D. Cal. 1975).
183. In re Schott v. Mission Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Advisory Op. of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board Resolution No. 75-647.
184. Current version at 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (1980).
185. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(g) (1980).
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on the substance of the question have found that the Bank Board's regula-
tions preempt conflicting state law."8 6 At least three state courts have
agreed with that conclusion.'87 Two California courts, however, recently
found that Bank Board regulations do not preempt state law.'88 A Florida
appeals court has ruled that, while the Bank Board may authorize the use
of due-on-sale clauses, enforcement in a state court of equity is subject to
valid state defenses.' 89
The question of which court is the proper forum has also been raised,
with three federal district courts finding that they lacked jurisdiction to
address the question of federal preemption. 190 Yet, the lone federal circuit
court to rule had no difficulty finding jurisdiction, although it upheld the
validity of the clause on the basis of state law.' 9'
On July 31, 1981 the Bank Board reiterated its "longstanding policy re-
garding the preemptive nature of its regulation ...to allay the uncer-
tainty expressed by a few state court."'
192
The complexity and irony of the existing situation, where the identity of
186. See generally First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Peterson, No. TCA 79-0940 (N.D.
Fla., filed June 22, 1981); Collins v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. C 80-334 (E.D.
Wash., filed May 18, 1981); Great Western Union Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Walters, No.
C79-906 V (W.D. Wash., filed June 18, 1980); Dantus v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of
Denver, 502 F. Supp. 658 (D. Colo. 1980); Nalore v. San Diego Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No.
77-0060-N (S.D. Cal. filed July 12, 1979), appeal pending; Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'ns v. Stein, 495 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1979), appealpending; Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1978), appeal pending.
187. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Jenkins, No. 80-354 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed Feb. 19,
1981); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Craig v. Duncan, No. 80CV-96 (Colo. Dist. Ct., filed
Sept. 8, 1980); Haugen v. Western Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. 79CV-4680 (Colo. Dist. Ct.,
filed June 18. 1980).
188. Panko v. Pan American Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. I Civ. 47918 (Ca. Ct. App.,
fied June 1, 1981); De La Cuesta v. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. 4 Civ. 23253 (Ca.
Ct. App., filed July 2, 1981).
189. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156, 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
190. Schultz v. Coral Gables Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 505 F. Supp. 1003, 1009 (S.D. Fla.
1981); Smart v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 500 F. Supp. 1147, 1167 (E.D. Mich. 1980);
People v. Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 728, 733 (C.D. Cal. 1979). Each of
these cases were remanded to state courts because the federal preemption question was
viewed as an anticipated defense rather than an issue raised in the complaint.
191. Williams v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, No. 80-1446 (4th Cir., filed May 26,
1981).
192. Statement of Policy Regarding Due-on-Sale Clauses in Mortgage Loan Contracts, 46
Fed. Reg. 39,123 at 39,124 (1981). Only three days earlier the National Credit Union Ad-
ministration in a similar move added a regulation which requires a federal credit union to
have a due-on-sale clause in its mortgage instruments and permits its exercise to increase'
portfolio yield. 46 Fed. Reg. 38,676, 38,677-78 (1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 701.21-
6(d). The Administration also claimed preemption of conflicting state laws. See 46 Fed.
Reg. 38,676 (1981).
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the originating lender is significant, was noted by a commentator regarding
the case of Nichols v. Ann Arbor Federal Savings and Loan Association. 193
Although the lender involved in the litigation was a federal savings and
loan association, the mortgage had been originated by a state chartered
institution, so the federal preemption argument was never made. Ann Ar-
bor Federal lost the case because the court determined that Michigan law
prohibits use of the due-on-sale clauses to raise interest rates. However, as
a federal savings and loan association, Ann Arbor Federal may enforce the
due-on-sale provision on loans it originates because the federal regulations
preempt the state laws. Thus, Ann Arbor Federal has assured itself of a
competitive advantage by losing the case. While there has been no sugges-
tion that this was part of a master strategy (nor is that suggestion being
made here) the possibilities of the situation would make Machiavelli
envious. 194
The courts that have disfavored the due-on-sale clause have done so for
two principal reasons. They have either found the clause to be an unrea-
sonable restraint on alienation, or ruled on equitable grounds that enforce-
ment was contrary to public policy. An examination of each of the
rationales follows.
VIII. RULINGS AGAINST DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSES
A. Restraint on Alienation
A restraint on alienation is defined in the Restatement of Property as:
[A]n attempt by an otherwise effective conveyance or contract
to cause a later conveyance:
(a) to be void; or
(b) to impose contractual liability on the one who makes the
later conveyance when such liability results from a breach of an
agreement not to convey; or
(c) to terminate or subject to termination all or part of the
property interest conveyed. 195
The public policy disfavoring restraints on alienation has been part of
the common law for seven centuries. 196 Limitations on the right of a prop-
193. 73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804 (1977). See also notes 81-83 and accompanying
text supra.
194. See Note, Mortgages-Due-on-Sale Clause Restraint on Aienation-Enforceability,
28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 503, 509-10 (1978).
195. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 404 (1976).
196. Common Law on Restraints-Statute Quia Emptores (18 Edw. I c.1) 1290.
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erty owner to dispose of his property are not enforceable to the extent that
they tend to remove land from the stream of commerce.
To date, no court, in determining a due-on-sale provision to be an un-
reasonable restraint on alienation, has identified how the clause satisfies
the definition. The analysis, to the extent there has been any, has involved
the weighing of the perceived social interest. The California Supreme
Court in Coast Bank'97 assumed, without analysis of the term, that the
clause was a reasonable restraint on alienation. Its subsequent decisions in
La Sala,198 Lassen199 and Wellenkamp 2°° were limited to the reasonable-
ness of enforcement. Thus, the California Supreme Court has concluded
that:
[A]lthough circumstances may arise in which the interests of
the lender justify the enforcement of a due-on clause in the event
of an outright sale, the mere fact of sale is not in itself sufficient to
warrant enforcement of the clause, and the restraint on alienation
resulting therefrom, in the absence of a showing by the lender
that such circumstances exist.2° '
The California court, in these cases, never supported its conclusion that the
clause is a restraint, reasonable or unreasonable, on alienation.
Not limiting itself to the Restatement definition, the Michigan Court of
Appeals was more direct about concluding that the clause was a restraint
on alienation. "If the mortgage clause defendant seeks to enforce can be
labeled a restraint on alienation only by expanding the restatement defini-
tion, we do not hesitate to stretch the term to include this 'due-on-sale'
clause. '
' 20 2
While the Arizona Supreme Court had found the exercise of the clause
to be unreasonable, a comparison of the California and Arizona cases may
be illuminating. California has made the common law prohibitions of re-
straints on alienation part of its statutory scheme, declaring: "Conditions
restraining alienation, when repugnant to the interest created, are void."2 3
Thus, the proper analysis in California is whether or not the due-on-sale
clause itself constitutes a condition restraining alienation. Furthermore,
the California statute suggests that the restraint and interest restrained
197. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
198. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
199. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
200. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
201. Id at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
202. Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804,
806 (1977).
203. CAL. CIv. CODE § 711 (Supp. 1980).
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arise from the same instrument, which is not the case in a due-on-sale
acceleration of a mortgage debt.
In Arizona, the relevant statute prohibits the arbitrary withholding of
consent to a transfer by the deed of trust beneficiary."° Therefore, the
Arizona courts are concerned solely with the reasonableness of the lender's
decision to withhold consent. The Arizona legislature has removed the
abstract question of whether or not the provision in a deed of trust consti-
tutes a restraint on alienation and requires its courts to focus only on the
conduct of the lender.
An American Bar Association's Subcommittee commented on the pau-
city of discussion by the various courts that have assumed that due-on-sale
clauses constitute a restraint on alienation:
Although discussed at length by legal scholars, it has been ill-
explained, if at all, in court decisions which most often proceed
from the premise that a restraint on alienation results from the
existence of enforcement of the clause. Obviously the due-on
clause does not prohibit transfer and cannot be enforced to pre-
vent the transfer. The clause first requires consent to transfer, but
the borrower is able to avoid obtaining that consent by paying
the debt. Any forfeiture or loss of the property can be avoided by
"redemption," the payment of the debt then due.2" 5
Even the legal scholars who have discussed the restraining nature of
due-on-sale clauses have been hard pressed to identify the way in which
the clause fits the Restatement definition of restraint on alienation. Profes-
sor Volkmer has discussed the issue and reached the admittedly not totally
satisfying conclusion:
Analytically ...there is a problem with this classification
since the due-on-sale clause does not fit exactly within any of the
established categories of direct restraints, disabling, forfeiture, or
promissory. Yet it would appear that the due-on-sale clause is so
closely akin to the promissory restraint as to justify designating it
a direct restraint ....
Although written as an acceleration clause, the due-on-sale
clause directly and fundamentally burdens a mortgagor's ability
to alienate as surely and directly as the classical promissory re-
straint. As such, the due-on-sale clause is truly a direct restraint
204. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 33-806.01 (West).
205. American Bar Association Subcommittee on "Due-on" Clauses of the Committee
on Real Estate Financing, Enforcement of Due-on Transfer Clauses-A Review and Commen-
tary of the State of the Law on Enforceability ofAcceleration Provisions in Mortgages and
Deeds of Trust by Reason of Transfer of an Interest in Security, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 891, 898 (1978) (footnote omitted).
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insofar as the category of direct restraints can be articulated.2"6
The cases and scholars who have criticized the enforcement of due-on-
sale clauses for increases in the interest rate have contended either that
enforcement reduces the value of the borrower's property, or that the
clause was being used for other than its legitimate purpose. Those conten-
tions will be explored further.
B. Impact on Property Value
One of the early commentators on the impact on property value stated
the issue in relatively simple terms:
If the seller does not reduce the price he sustains a loss for the
benefit of the lender and, in effect, sells the property for less than
its true value. If he refuses to reduce the price and thereby loses
the sale, a real estate broker will suffer severely for reasons hav-
ing no legitimate connection with the normal operation of those
economic forces which should govern the supply and demand
and transfer of real property interests ....
It is economically irrational to have differentiations in the
value of similar properties because of something having no rea-
sonable connection with their productivity; and yet, because of
the different rates of interest charged or chargeable on mortgages
on otherwise identical pieces of property, one will have a higher
value than the other.
20 7
This rationale is similar to that adopted by the Wellenkamp court. This
approach assumes that property has an inherent value, unrelated to market
factors such as current interest rates. Surprisingly, although the impact on
value has been discussed in many cases and scholarly legal writings, none
of them have consulted the professional appraisal societies,2"' whose mem-
bers devote themselves to the determination of the value of real estate.
The major appraisal organizations have defined value as, "The quantity
of one thing which can be obtained for another." 2" More illuminating is
their definition of "Market Value" as:
206. Volkmer, The Application of the Restraints on Alienation Doctrine to Real Property
Security Interests, 58 IOWA L. REV. 747, 773-74 (1973). The Restatement of Property
§ 404(3) designates the type of restraint defined in § 404(1)(b) as a promissory restraint. See
text accompanying note 195 supra.
207. Bonanno, Due on Sale and Prepayment Clauses in Real Estate Financing in Calfornia
in Times of Fluctuating Interest Rates--Legal Issues and Alternatives, 6 U.S.F.L. REV. 267,
284-85 (1972).
208. See, e.g., Wellencamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 379 (1978); Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580
(1976); Bonanno, supra note 207.
209. B. BOYCE, REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL TERMINOLOGY 215 (1975). (Sponsored jointly
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The highest price in terms of money which a property will
bring in a competitive and open market under all conditions req-
uisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently,
knowledgeably and assuming the price is not affected by undue
stimulus.
Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a
specified date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under
conditions whereby:
(5) financing, f any, is on terms generally available in the com-
munity at the specyied date and typical/or the property type in its
locale. 210
Thus, in the eyes of the professional appraiser, financing at current mar-
ket rates, rather than being a distortion of the value of the property, is an
assumed condition of determining value. In other words, increasing the
interest rate of the assumed mortgage, which results in a reduction of the
sales price, does not reduce the fair price that the seller receives but elimi-
nates a premium that the buyer would have otherwise paid. Commenting
on this result, one author has explained that:
Attackers of the use of such clauses to allow increased interest
rates upon the transfer of mortgaged property apparently feel
that there exists an inherent right for one to assume another's
mortgage at his favorable rate of interest. . . . When the rela-
tionship between the parties to a mortgage ceases, so also do the
terms of their accord. Allowing a personal contract to be freely
bartered runs counter to the nature of such an agreement ...
• . . It certainly cannot be deemed equitable to allow mortga-
gors to refinance their purchase whenever interest rates fall, while
maintaining that lenders must be forever locked into terms which
become oppressive because of a tight money market. The ineq-
uity of this situation becomes even more apparent when the
mortgagor who is allowed such superior rights was not a party to
the agreement, but rather received its favorable terms through a
transfer from the original borrower. 211
C Legitimate Purpose of Clause
It seems clear that neither buyer nor seller may fairly claim that the due-
by the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers and the Society of Real Estate
Appraisers).
210. Id at 137 (emphasis added).
211. Comment, Acceleration Clauses as a Protection for Mortgagees in a Tight Money
Market, 8 S. DAK. L. REV. 334, 35 (1975).
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on-sale clause deprives him of a right to which he is entitled. However,
that does not respond to the claim that use of the clause to increase interest
rates is a misuse providing the lender with benefits to which it is not
entitled.
The commentators who have addressed the issue have differed sharply
over what the contemplation of the parties might reasonably have been
when the mortgage was originated. Thus, in a discussion of Baltimore Life
Insurance Co. v. Ham,2" 2 the court's assumption was challenged:
The opinion presupposes that the only purpose for including
such a clause, and the only purpose within the contemplation of
the parties, is to reduce the lender's moral risks. To give binding
authority to such a presupposition is unwise, for if acceleration
clauses are truly bargained for, their use to increase the interest
rate as provided by the acceleration clause, could easily be within
the contemplation of both parties.2" 3
However, another commentator, has suggested that "if the clause's only
purpose was to protect the security interest of the mortgagee, it would be
iOsofacto enforceable." '214 This commentator differs as to the contempla-
tion of the parties regarding possible interest rate increases:
[U]nless made expressly clear, a borrower should not be
chargeable with knowledge that consent will be denied a sale to
an acceptable purchaser unless the interest rate is increased ...
[T]he enforcement of due-on-sale clauses should correspond
with the expectations of the parties at the execution of the agree-
ment. If the lender wants to extend control over the property so
that the lending rate can be renegotiated, a clear statement of
such intent should be evident.215
Another commentator has indicated that the setting of the original bar-
gaining may establish whether or not the due-on-sale clause was a bar-
gained-for element." 6 Thus, this commentator has suggested that if the
borrower had been offered a variable rate mortgage, but chose a fixed rate
loan instead, the due-on-sale clause could reasonably be considered a bar-
212. 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971), cert. denied, 108 Ariz. 192, 494 P.2d 1322
(1972).
213. Comment, Use of "Due-on" Clauses to Gain Collateral Benefits: A Common Sense
Defense, 10 TULSA L.J. 590, 595 (1975).
214. Comment, Mortgages--A Catalogue and Critique of Equity in the Enforcement of
Modern-Day "Due-on-Sale" Clauses, 26 ARK. L. REV. 485, 493 (1973). See also Note, Judi-
cial Treatment of the Due-on-Sale Clause." The Casefor Adopting Standards of Reasonable-
ness and Unconscionability, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1109, 1124 (1975).
215. Comment, supra note 214, at 505.
216. Comment, supra note 46, at 127.
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gained-for element of the mortgage.21 7
It seems clear that a due-on-sale provision, which like covenant 17 of the
FNMA/FHLMC form, puts the borrower on notice of the possibility of an
interest rate increase as the price of approval of a transfer, is preferrable to
a clause silent on the matter. However, there is still some disagreement as
to the propriety of the use of the clause for this purpose. Thus, the Wel-
lenkamp court could say:
Economic risks such as those caused by an inflationary econ-
omy are among the general risks inherent in every lending trans-
action. They are neither enforceable nor unforeseen. Lenders
who provide funds for long-term real estate loans should and do,
as a matter of business necessity, take into account their projec-
tions of future economic conditions when they initially determine
the rate of payment and the interest on these long-term loans.2' s
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Occidental Savings and Loan"1 9 took
an entirely different view of the matter:
[T]he assets of savings and loan associations are principally in-
vested in long-term mortgages, while on the other hand, the
funds necessary to make such loans are obtained from short-term
and demand savings accounts and certificates. As the cost of ob-
taining deposits rises, the spread widens between what the associ-
ation must pay for funds by way of interest and what the
association receives from borrowers. Once the spread gets too
great, the association will be unable to meet the standards set by
government regulations and will fail.220
A review of recent developments as they impact the savings and loan
industry, the chief source of conventional mortgage financing, suggests
that the Nebraska court was viewing the lending environment more realis-
tically. Between 1976 and 1980, spread between the interest return on the
mortgages held by FSLIC-insured savings and loan associations and the
average cost of funds of those institutions has fallen from 1.57% to
.037%.221 This squeeze is the result of the inability of the associations'
mortgage investment yields to keep pace with the rapidly increased cost of
obtaining funds.
Prior to June 1, 1978, the primary source of funds for savings and loan
associations was passbook accounts. Regulation Q of the Federal Reserve
217. Id
218. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 952, 582 P.2d 970, 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 386 (1978).
219. 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980).
220. Id at 477, 293 N.W.2d at 849.
221. 14 FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD J., vol. 7, 89-90 (Tables S.4.8 and S.4.10).
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Board222 established a differential of 0.25% between the maximum rate of
interest that thrift institutions could pay passbook depositors and the rate
that commercial banks could pay. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board
had established 5.25% as the maximum passbook rate in 1973.223 (This
was raised to 5.50% on July 1, 1979.) Because of the relatively low fixed
rates payable by thrift institutions in times of tight money, they frequently
suffered large losses of deposits, a process termed disintermediation. On
June 1, 1978, to enable depository institutions to compete with other
money market instruments, the depository institutions were authorized to
issue money market certificates (MMCs) for at least $10,000 with six
month maturities and returns tied to the average rate of newly issued six
month United States Treasury bills.224 On January 1, 1980, they were au-
thorized to issue two and one-half year certificates of much smaller de-
nomination (typically as little as $100) tied to the yield of newly issued
thirty month United States Treasury securities.225
As a result of providing savers with returns comparable to those avail-
able elsewhere, the average cost of funds payable by thrift institutions has
skyrocketed.226 In addition, section 202 of the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 provides, within six years,
for the phase out and ultimate elimination of all limitations on the maxi-
mum rates of interest and dividends payable by depository institutions. 2
27
Thus, over the last few years the main source of mortgage financing has
seen its cost of money skyrocket, and these institutions can anticipate being
totally at the mercy of money market rates within six years. The changes
that have and will occur are not those that were or could have been fore-
seen by these institutions.
Although mortgage rates have risen as rapidly as costs of funds,228 the
222. 12 C.F.R. § 217.7(c) (1980).
223. Current version at 12 C.F.R. § 526.3(a)(1) (1980).
224. Id § 526.3(a)(8) (1980).
225. Id § 526.3(a)(4)(ii) (1980). See also 14 FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD J., vol. 7,
91 (Table S.4.12 n. 17-Maximum Rates of Return Payable on Savings Accounts by S & Ls
that are Members of the FHLB System).
226. 14 FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD J., vol. 7, 89 (Table S.4.8-The Average Cost of
Funds to FSLIC Insured Savings and Loan Associations). Semiannual averages have risen
dramatically recently. Actual averages were 6.35%-Ist half 1976, 6.40/ 0---2d half 1976,
6.39%--1st half 1977, 6.48%--2d half 1977, 6.54%--lst half 1978, 6.79%--2d half 1978,
7.23% 1st half 1979, 7.71%-2d half 1979, 8.77%-Ist half 1980, 9.11%-2d half 1980.
227. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94
Stat. 132 (1980) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(g) (Supp. IV 1980)).
228. The semiannual average for interest rates received on the portfolio of mortgages
held by FSLIC-insured savings and loan associations was 7.87%--st half 1976, 8.03%---2d
half 1976, 8.14%-Ist half 1977, 8.28%--2d half 1977, 8.39%-st half 1978, 8.54%---2d half
1978, 8.70%--st half 1979, 8.95%-2d half 1979, 9.18%-st half 1980, 9.44%--2d 1980. Id
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impact of higher new mortgage rates for a portfolio of thirty year loans
takes much longer to be felt than do changes in passbook accounts which
are effected immediately, changes in the MMCs which mature semiannu-
ally, or even changes in the thirty month certificates. As mortgage rates
rise, the volume of new mortgages has tended to decrease. 229 Further-
more, borrowers who took out mortgages when rates were at their highest
will tend to refinance their loans should rates fall.230 Thus, while rates
paid to all savers tend to approach the maximums currently allowable, the
return on the lender's mortgage portfolio is an average of all loans made
over time, with a weighting in favor of the lower rates.
In the current environment, the reasonableness of enforcing due-on-sale
clauses to protect the lender's portfolio must be reexamined. Some of the
articles critical of the practice were written at a time when the mortgage
rates were "at the extraordinary rate of 9.27%,"23' which today would be
referred to as "the good old days."
By restricting the use of due-on-sale clauses, courts have tended to view
the conflict as that between the individual home seller and a large financial
institution. It may not be coincidental that the defendant in Wellenkamp
was the largest banking institution in the United States, the Bank of
America. The Wellenkamp court indicated in a footnote that this factor
made a difference:
In the instant case the party seeking enforcement of the due-on
clause is an institutional lender. We limit our holding accord-
ingly. We express no present opinion on the question whether a
private lender, including the vendor who takes back secondary
financing, has interests which might inherently justify automatic
enforcement of a due-on clauses in his favor upon resale.232
Refering to Nichols v. Ann Arbor Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
at 90 (Table S.4.10). The average effective rate at which savings and loan associations, mort-
gage bankers, commercial banks and mutual savings banks closed new loans was 9.02% in
1977, 9.56% in 1978, 10.87% in 1979 and 12,86% in 1980. By May 1981, the figure had risen
to 14.49%. Id at 92 (Table S.5.1).
229. Total amount of mortgage loans closed (in $ millions) by FSLIC insured associa-
tions were 105,287 in 1977, 198,273 in 1978, 98,730 in 1979 and 71,270 in 1980. Id at 88
(Table S.4.5). The reduced dollar amounts reflect an even smaller number of units as in-
creased house prices have raised the size of the typical mortgage required.
230. Since August 1979, the FNMA/FHLMC Note forms have permitted prepayment at
any time without penalty.
231. Bonanno, supra note 207, at 268. See also Note, supra note 214, at 1109.
232. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 952 n.9, 582 P.2d 970, 976 n.9, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 386 n.9 (1978). A
lower California court has decided that Wellenkamp was not applicable to the seller of a ten
unit apartment building who had taken back a second trust as part of the sale. Dawn Inv.
Co. v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles, 116 Cal. App. 3d 450, 172 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1981).
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lion,233 a commentator has suggested that the interests involved may not
be those indicated above. Rather, the interests of the parties to the particu-
lar transaction involved may compete with those of all individuals in the
market for mortgage money generally. As the author explained:
Perhaps the simplest way to analyze the problem that Nichols
raises is to ask: Who should benefit from an increase in interest
rates? If the mortgagor is allowed to use his low interest rate to
enhance the marketability of the property, only he (and possibly
the vendee) will profit. On the other hand, if the mortgagee is
permitted to accelerate the loan and relend at the prevailing rate,
he presumably will be able to maintain lower interest rates on
new loans, and the benefit will be spread among all home
buyers.234
Another commentator has suggested that the balance clearly belongs
with enforcement: "Due-on-sale clauses allow borrowers to receive a
lower rate, longer terms on the mortgage contract and more readily avail-
able mortgage credit. 235
While the need for a lending institution to maintain its portfolio at cur-
rent interest rates has been conceded by many of the critics of due-on-sale
provisions, they have suggested that the provision is not the appropriate
mechanism, since other devices are at hand.236 The Wellenkamp court
suggested that California lenders could protect their portfolios by use of
variable interest rate mortgages.237 Effective April 1981, the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board issued regulations authorizing federal savings
and loan associations to make Adjustable Mortgage Loan Instruments.238
These are completely flexible regulations permitting interest rates tied to
any index verifiable by the borrower and beyond the control of the lender.
No limitations are placed on the frequency of rate adjustment or the size of
adjustment (either periodically or in the aggregate). The Board indicated
that market forces would provide any restraints required in the secondary
market.
The Comptroller of the Currency has also issued regulations which per-
233. 73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804 (1977).
234. Note, supra note 194, at 513.
235. Note, Mortgages-Use of Due-on-Sale Clause by a Lender ir Not a Restraint on
Alienation in North Carolina, 55 N.C.L. REV. 310, 319 (1977).
236. Henkel and Seltzer, Acceleration Clauses in Mortgages; Misuse During Periods of
Tight Money, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 441, 443 (1980).
237. 21 Cal, 3d at 952 n.10, 582 P.2d at 976 n.10, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 386 n.10. See also
Comment, supra note 41, at 523.
238. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,148 (1981) (amending 12 C.F.R. § 5456 (1980)).
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mit national banks to make adjustable rate mortgages. 239 Under these reg-
ulations the interest rate is tied to one of three specified indices. Rates may
not be adjusted more often than semiannually. Interest rate increases are
limited to 2% per year, but there is no aggregate limitation.
While each of these regulations represents significant steps toward al-
lowing mortgages in lender portfolios to be sensitive to money market
rates, it will be some time before they have an impact on existing portfo-
lios. This is especially true since their introduction has coincided with a
period of very low activity.
In addition to California, several other states have permitted variable
rate mortgages, but the due-on-sale controversy has not been mooted.
While traditional policies and rules governing real property,
such as the disfavor of restraints on alienation, cannot be ig-
nored, courts must not lose sight of the fact that money lenders
must be able to profit from their business. If savings and loans
are not permitted to employ the due-on clause in their deeds of
trust, they will be forced to utilize other methods of maintaining
higher interest rates. At this point, the alternatives seem decid-
edly inferior. Variable interest rates have not met with enthusi-
asm and short term loans would prevent many individuals from
borrowing at all.24
The trend to adjustable rate or shorter term loans, as a means of keeping
portfolio yields at current interest rates, is liable to have an effect unantici-
pated by the state policy makers, who have suggested such routes as alter-
natives to due-on-sale enforcement. There is little doubt that the critics of
due-on-sale rate increases view themselves as consumer protectors. The
main beneficiaries of their efforts presumably are the buyers and sellers of
real estate. However, while protecting those who frequently buy and sell,
they may be inadvertently harming those who remain in their homes for
long periods of time. If the long term owner obtains a fixed rate loan, the
initial interest rate is liable to be higher than if the lender had reasonable
expectations of increasing the rate upon sale. Since the lender does not
have the ability to turn over a statistically predictable portion of its portfo-
ho through sales, it must try to project its costs further into the future;
because of the uncertainty, higher initial interest rates may result. How-
ever, if the lender can exercise due-on-sale provisions, it knows that a cer-
tain percentage of its loans will be subject to renegotiation. It is, therefore,
more likely to accept a lower initial interest rate.
239. 46 Fed. Reg. 18,932 (1981).
240. Comment, The Due-on-Sale Clause As a Reasonable Restraint on Alienation-A Pro-
posalfor Texas, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 514, 524 (1976).
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Thus, the benefits of a restriction on due-on-sale enforcement that ac-
crue to the home seller are at the expense, ultimately, not of the lending
institution, but of the mortgagor who maintains his mortgage for the full
term. Similarly, if the lender chooses to adopt a variable rate instrument,
the mortgagor whose loan goes full term is likely to be subsidizing the
short term homeowner. While generalizations are dangerous in this re-
gard, the ultimate beneficiaries are liable to be the upwardly mobile ele-
ments of our society, while the costs will be most heavily borne by those on
relatively fixed incomes, such as the elderly or lower income groups.
While surely it is within the realm of possibility for policy makers to en-
gage in such a choice, there does not appear to be evidence to suggest that
it was, in fact, intended.
One commentator has suggested the possibility that due-on-sale restric-
tions will have an adverse impact on reverse annuity mortgages
(RAMs).2 41 RAMs are one of the alternative mortgage instruments au-
thorized for federal savings and loans by the FHLBB. Basically, they per-
mit an owner with substantial equity in a home to draw down that equity
by receiving a check from the lender for a period of time, building up a
mortgage which is later retired. The author explains that:
All three types of RAMs fulfill the same purposes. They allow
homeowners-in particular elderly homeowners-to remain in
their homes while supplementing income. Yet ironically, the fu-
ture of RAMs may have been clouded by recent decisions seeking
to facilitate the sale rather than retention of homes.
Assuming that RAMs perform a socially valuable function, so-
ciety might be harmed if lenders refused to offer RAMs in the
future or offered them at higher interest rates to compensate for
their inability to roll them over.2 42
D. Secondary Market Impact
The impact on the borrowing public may not. be limited to just those
interested in obtaining a RAM. On October 23, 1980, FNMA announced
a major change in its approach to due-on-sale enforcement. 243 Effective
with loans it contracted to buy beginning November 10, 1980, it requires
enforcement of the due-on-sale provision in the FNMA/FHLMC Uni-
form Mortgage or Deed of Trust. Transferees with acceptable credit will
241. Note, ReverseeAnnuity Mortgages and the Due-on-Sale Clause, 32 STAN. L. REV. 143
(1979).
242. Id at 150 (emphasis added).
243. The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 24, 1980, at 15, col. 2.
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be allowed to assume the existing loan, provided they agree to pay the
current market interest rate. FNMA identified eleven jurisdictions244 in
which its right to exercise the due-on-sale provision, in the manner they
intend, is restricted by statutory or case law. In those jurisdictions, FNMA
will only purchase mortgages if they contain a call option rider. This rider
permits the lender to require payment in full of the mortgage when it is
seven years old.
FNMA probably chose seven years as the call date since that repre-
sented the average life of loans in its portfolio. Thus, in those eleven juris-
dictions, mortgagors who sell their homes within seven years retain some
of the benefits of a due-on-sale restriction. However, those borrowers who
stay in their homes more than seven years face uncertain refinancing
probabilities, if not the loss of their homes.
Within days of FNMA's announcement, the Wall Street Journal carried
a feature story indicating that the nation's largest savings and loan associa-
tion was discontinuing the origination of first mortgages to concentrate on
shorter term, higher rate second mortgage finance.245 That action made
prophetic words written two years earlier: "[A] question legitimately may
be asked whether a consumer, who is protected to the point that he or she
can no longer get home financing because the sources of funds have dried
out, is that much better off than before."246
The FNMA call option rider is not required of federal savings and loan
associations since the due-on-sale provision is arguably enforceable under
the FHLBB regulations. Earlier, FHLMC had announced its unwilling-
ness to purchase loans in Minnesota and Georgia from lenders other than
federal savings and loan associations because of these states' restrictions on
the credit underwriting aspects of transfers.
These actions present serious problems for state authorities in the states
in which FNMA is requiring the call option rider. As current conditions
make depository institutions less able to rely on deposits as their source of
funds for long-term mortgage lending, greater reliance will have to be
placed on the secondary mortgage market as a source of liquidity. Thus,
even if immediate sale is not anticipated, prudent management will require
any loans the institution makes to be potentially marketable. For institu-
tions other than federal savings and loans associations, this will probably
suggest inclusion of a call option rider for possible sale to FNMA.
244. They are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minne-
sota, New Mexico, South Carolina and Washington.
245. The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 5, 1980 at 31, col. 3.
246. Bartke & Tagaropulos, MAichigan's Looking Glass World of Due-on-Sale Clauses, 24
WAYNE L. REV. 971, 1002 (1978).
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However, federal savings and loan associations in those jurisdictions
will be able to originate fixed rate mortgages without the call option rider.
This could give the federal associations a competitive advantage over the
state-chartered institutions. One way the state-chartered institutions might
compete is to lower the yield requirements for the loans it makes with the
call option rider. However, since state-chartered institutions compete with
federal savings and loan associations for savers' dollars, their costs of
funds are likely to be nearly the same. If the average life of a mortgage
loan is seven years, the federal association will be able to match the yield
quotes of the state-chartered association. The only way the state-chartered
institution could then attract business is by offering to make loans with
interest rates that are unprofitable to its competition, but unfortunately,
also unprofitable to themselves. So long as the federal savings and loan
associations are able to offer mortgage terms that are more palatable than
those available from state-chartered institutions, the state-chartered lend-
ers are faced with the possibility of eventual insolvency. An interesting
attempted solution to this problem has been enacted in Florida, where a
statute gives Florida-chartered savings and loan associations the same
rights afforded federal savings and loan associations.247
Another way the state-chartered institution might seek to overcome the
competitive disadvantage would be to become a federal savings and loan
association. In either event, adherence to a policy of restricting due-on-
sale enforcement by state policymakers is liable to lead to the attrition of
the state-chartered savings and loan industry, by either insolvency or ab-
sorption into the federal system. Even if the institutions remain, they are
unlikely to be able to compete for the first mortgage business and will have
to confine their activities to other kinds of lending.
While the result might suggest a heavy-handed federal imposition. of
due-on-sale upon unwilling states, that is too much of an oversimplication.
For one thing, in some of the states, the policy restricting due-on-sale has
come from the judicial branch. In the absence of a pronouncement from
the legislative branch of state government, it is difficult to say that the pub-
lic policy of the state is contrary to enforcement of due-on-sale clauses,
especially when no state court that has ruled against due-on-sale has ade-
quately dealt with all the issues involved.
E. Uniform Land Transaction Act (UL TA) Approach
The impact and desirability of a national secondary market was recog-
nized by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. In 1975 they pro-
247. FLA. STAT. § 665.073(8) (Supp. 1980).
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posed a Uniform Land Transaction Act (ULTA).24 s In explaining the
need for the ULTA, the Commissioners said:
For a number of years, persons concerned about generating
sufficient resources for the production of adequate housing for all
segments of society have been interested in restructuring of pri-
vate law, as well as the use of various governmental programs, as
a way of stimulating the housing market. Particularly, there is
growing emphasis on a national secondary market for real estate
mortgages which would encourage various financial entities to in-
vest in mortgage backed securities. . . . One of the major pur-
poses of this Act is to provide uniformity in state law which will
facilitate the creation of a legal atmosphere which encourages de-
velopment of a widespread secondary mortgage market. In addi-
tion to encouraging the secondary market, uniformity of state law
will encourage widespread lending by financial entities which
presently may restrict their lending to a few states because of the
difficulties and additional expense involved in dealing in other
states with widely varying laws.249
The ULTA deals with the question of due-on-sale enforcement as
follows:
(a) Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, a
debtor's right to collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily
transferred. The security agreement may provide that a sale
without consent of the secured creditor is a ground for accelera-
tion of the debt.
(b) Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, if a se-
cured creditor demands a rate of interest higher than that speci-
fied in the security agreement or other consideration (exclusive of
reimbursement for reasonable expenses and reasonable assump-
tion charges) as a condition of approval of a transfer by a pro-
tected party of his interest in residential real estate subject to a
security interest, and the higher rate of interest or other consider-
ation is not agreed to, a prepayment penalty may not be charged
if the debt is paid in full within three months after the failure to
agree to a higher rate of interest.2 50
The FNMA/FHLMC documents are compatible with the ULTA ap-
,proach since the note forms do not provide for a prepayment penalty at
any time. However, to date, the ULTA has not been adopted in any state.
248. Uniform Land Transaction Act (1977).
249. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS & PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETINGS IN ITS EIGHTY-
FOURTH YEAR, 152 (1975).
250. Uniform Land Transaction Act § 3-208 (1977).
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IX. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the supply of conventional mortgage financing in the fu-
ture is dependent upon access to national sources of funds. It is equally
clear that a national source of funds is dependent upon uniform instru-
ments and reasonably similar approaches to basic questions of enforce-
ment. Among the basic questions that require uniform approach is the
enforcement of due-on-sale clauses. There appear to be at least two ways
in which this uniformity can be accomplished. The states, acting indepen-
dently, can provide for greater uniformity among the states by adoption of
the ULTA or similar provisions. Second, Congress could mandate the
uniformity by enacting ULTA-like legislation and imposing it on the
states, much like it did with the usury law override.
To the extent that Congress has established two large secondary market
facilities (FNMA and FHLMC), the argument might be made that Con-
gress has already entered the arena of due-on-sale enforcement. If so, pos-
sibly any mortgage eligible for sale to either of the corporations might be
found to be exempt from state law prohibition of enforcement of due-on-
sale clauses.
While there are many possible arguments that could be made to the var-
ious courts dealing with the issue, that approach is a long, uncertain one
and will probably lead to inconsistent results. In view of the increasing
dependence that local real estate markets will have on national capital
markets for sources of funds, the ultimate victims of a case by case ap-
proach are likely to be the intended beneficiaries. Thus, national adoption
of a ULTA-like approach to due-on-sale enforcement, either by state or
federal action, is vital to the real interests of borrowers and lenders alike.
The equity courts in states, like New Jersey and New York, which per-
mit due-on-sale enforcement, have shown that they are capable of prevent-
ing abusive enforcement of the provision when unusual circumstances are
present. Even under a ULTA approach, the courts could intervene in
those unusual circumstances of lender overreaching. In the final analysis,
that is all that is required to best protect the interests of all concerned.
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